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Abstract
The goal of this dissertation is to shed some light on three separate aspects of the financial
system that can lead to greater instability in the banking sector and greater macroeconomic
volatility. The starting point of the Great Recession was the collapse of the banking sector
in late 2007; in the subsequent months, liquidity evaporated in many markets for short term
funding. The process of creating liquidity carried out by the banking system involves the
transformation of long term illiquid assets into short term liquid liabilities. This engine
functions properly as long as cash lenders continue to roll over short term funding to banks;
whenever these lenders fear that banks will not be able to pay back these obligations, they
immediately stop funding banks’ short term liabilities. This makes banks unable to repay
maturing short term debt, which leads to large spikes in default risk. This is often referred
to as a modern bank run. Virtually all the theories of bank runs suggest that the severity of
a run depends on how well lenders can coordinate their beliefs: whenever a lender expects
many others to run, he becomes more likely to run as well.
In a joint work with Emanuele Brancati, the first chapter of my dissertation, we empirically
document the role of coordination in explaining bank runs and default risk. We establish two
new results. First, when information is more precise and agents can better coordinate their
actions, a change in market expectations has a larger impact on default risk; this implies that
more precise information increases the vulnerability or instability of the banking system.
This result has a clear policy implication: if policymakers want to stabilize the banking
system they should promote opacity instead of transparency, especially during periods of
financial turmoil. Second, we show that when a bank is expected to perform poorly, lower
dispersion of beliefs actually increases default risk; this result is in contrast with standard
theories in finance and can be rationalized by thinking about the impact that more precise
information has on the ability of creditors to coordinate on a bank run.
Another aspect of the banking system that is creating a lot of instability in Europe is the
so called “disastrous banks-sovereign nexus”: many banks in troubled countries owned a
disproportionately large amount of domestic sovereign bonds; therefore, in case of a default
of the sovereign country, the whole domestic banking sector would incur insurmountable
losses. This behavior is puzzling because these banks in troubled countries would greatly
benefit from having a more diversified asset portfolio, but instead decide to load up with
domestic sovereign debt only. In a joint work with Filippo De Marco, the second chapter
of my dissertation, we show that banks receive political pressures from their respective
governments to load up on domestic sovereigns. First, we show that banks with a larger
fraction of politicians as shareholders display greater home bias. More importantly, we
exploit the fact that low-performing banks received liquidity injections by their domestic
governments to show that, among those banks, only the “political banks” drastically in-
creased their home bias upon receiving government help. Furthermore, it appears that the
extent of political pressure on banks is much stronger on those “political banks” belonging
to troubled countries. These findings suggest that troubled countries that would need to
pay a high premium to issue new debt force their “political banks” to purchase part of
the debt issuance. This greater risk-synchronization can create a dangerous loop of higher
sovereign default risk leading to insolvency of the domestic banking system, which in turn
would require a bail-out from the local government, further exacerbating the sovereign de-
fault risk.
Finally, the third chapter of my dissertation, a joint work with Susanto Basu, investigates
the sources of excess consumption volatility in emerging markets. It is a well documented
fact that, in emerging markets, consumption is more volatile than output whereas the op-
posite is true in developed economies. We propose an explanation for this phenomenon that
relies on a specific form of financial markets incompleteness: we assume that households
would always want to front-load consumption and they can borrow from abroad up to a
fraction of the value of posted collateral. With the value of collateral being procyclical,
households are able to increase borrowing during an expansion and ultimately consume
more than they produce; this mechanism is then able to generate a ratio of consumption
volatility to output volatility grater than one. Most importantly, the model delivers the
implication that a better ability to borrow vis-a-vis the same value of collateral generates
greater relative consumption volatility. We then bring this model’s implication to the data
and find empirical support for it. We proxy the ability to borrow with various measures of
effectiveness of lending regulation and more standard indicators of financial development.
Consistent with the model’s implication, more lending friendly regulation leads to greater
relative consumption volatility in emerging markets; moreover, this link breaks down among
developed countries. In addition, among emerging countries, it appears that deeper do-
mestic capital markets have a destabilizing effect in terms of greater relative consumption
volatility while a more developed domestic banking system does not exerts any such detri-
mental effect.
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1. The Role of Dispersed Information in
Pricing Default: Evidence from the
Great Recession
1.1. Introduction
During financial turmoil, coordination motives among creditors are often thought to be cru-
cial in determining whether a financial institution will be granted access to credit or default
on its maturing debt. Which outcome will prevail is often regarded as being unpredictable;
for this reason many have thought about banks’ defaults as being triggered by sunspots. Di-
amond and Dybvig (1983) formalize this idea of sunspots-driven financial crises in a model
of bank runs.1 The limitation of this approach is that, by relying on multiple equilibria,
it does not explain what triggers a crisis, making the theory virtually untestable; this fact,
1Prominent advocates of this view of bank runs as random events are Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and
Kindleberger (1978). For models of banking panics with multiple equilibria, see also Chen (1999) and
Peck and Shell (2003) even though the focus of the former is on the possibility of contagious bank runs.
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together with the availability of new evidence that banking panics are not random events,
leads theorists to focus on the predictability of bank runs.2 Morris and Shin (2001) provide
a theory that explicitly models coordination among market participants; the usefulness of
this theory rests on its ability to predict how the probability of a crisis depends on market
expectations and dispersion of beliefs.
We extend Morris and Shin (2004)’ s model so that it directly maps into the empirical
data and then test the implications of this theory. We find evidence that more concen-
trated beliefs act as a coordination device that, under certain conditions, reduces creditors’
willingness to roll over debt to a bank, thus increasing both its probability of default and
its vulnerability to changes in market expectations. We use Credit Default Swap (CDS)
spreads as a proxy for banks’ default risk and a survey of professional forecasters to mea-
sure both market expectations and dispersion of beliefs. Our empirical analysis delivers two
main results.
First, when forecasts about a bank’s future profitability are unfavorable, lower dispersion
of beliefs greatly increases the bank’s default risk: a one standard deviation decrease in
dispersion of beliefs leads to an increase in the CDS spread that ranges from 104 to 201
basis points, which is between 43% and 83% of a standard deviations of CDS spread in
times of crisis (Sep 2007 - Dec 2012). This result is consistent with incomplete information
2See Gorton (1988) and Calomiris and Gorton (1991) for early evidence against the sunspot view of bank
runs; see Calomiris and Mason (2003) for more recent evidence on runs during the Great Depression
and Covitz, Liang and Suarez (2013) for what concerns the predictability of runs on short term debt
in the 2007 crisis. See Postlewaite and Vives (1987), Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and Jacklin and
Bhattacharya (1988) for early papers of bank runs featuring equilibrium uniqueness; for more recent
studies, see Morris and Shin (2004), Rochet and Vives (2004), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) and He and
Xiong (2012).
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models that incorporate coordination motives, such as Morris and Shin (2004) and Rochet
and Vives (2004), while it is in contrast with a wide range of incomplete information models
that neglect coordination risk and focus solely on the Jensen inequality effect, whereby less
dispersion decreases credit spreads. Moreover, prior to the crisis (Jan 2005 - Aug 2007) the
direct effect of dispersion of beliefs on default risk is not statistically significant in most
specifications and it becomes slightly positive and significant at the 10% level only when we
consider favorable forecasts.3 This suggests that when a bank is expected to perform well,
debt is largely informationally insensitive and greater dispersion slightly increases default
risk, i.e. the Jensen inequality effect prevails; however, when a bank is expected to perform
poorly, debt becomes much more sensitive to information, coordination motives among
creditors become very important and less dispersion increases default risk. The evidence
that the information sensitivity of debt largely depends on how poorly a bank is expected
to perform is consistent with Dang, Gorton and Holmstro¨m (2012); they theorize that bad
news can make debt informationally sensitive, potentially leading to endogenous adverse
selection and credit freezes.4
Second, precise information has an indirect effect on default risk as well; this operates
through amplifying the impact of market expectations on the CDS spread. Compared to
the amplification due to high leverage or greater reliance on unstable sources of funding,
the largest multiplier is obtained by more precise information. In particular, the marginal
3However, the reliability of pre-crisis estimates is undermined by weak instruments problems.
4Similarly, Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2012) show that during periods of financial tranquillity debt is information-
ally insensitive, but when a crisis occurs agents have incentives to produce information on counterparty
risk.
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effect of forecasts on default risk is 2.5 times larger when information is precise rather
than imprecise, an “unconditional” multiplier of 2.5; moreover, if we consider only fragile
banks the “conditional” multiplier due to precise information ranges from 3.5 to 5.5.5 This
last set of findings suggests that more concentrated information greatly increases banks’
vulnerability to changes in market expectations. Additional research is needed to better
understand the determinants of dispersed information at both theoretical and empirical
levels. Moreover, as the degree of information precision is the primary factor affecting
banks’ vulnerability, our results suggest that the stability of the banking system can be
improved in possibly two ways: first, by monitoring the evolution of bank-specific measures
of dispersion of beliefs and targeting liquidity support especially to banks about which
forecasters hold more homogeneous beliefs; second, in times of crisis, ex-ante stability of
the banking system can be improved by reducing the degree of information precision. The
last point resembles what the first U.S. clearinghouses used to do during financial turmoil,
as described in Gorton (1985). Moreover, this empirical finding that precise information
increases the vulnerability of banks is not only consistent with our model but also with a
subset of the literature that studies the effect of transparency on bank runs: in Siritto (2013)
an increase in transparency leads to greater banks’ vulnerability to runs and, in a model
of bank runs and adverse selection, de Faria e Castro, Martinez and Philippon (2014) show
that more precise information greatly benefits good banks while exposing worse banks to
5On the other hand, unconditional multipliers due to the different measures of fragility range from 1.3 to
2.8, but are not statistically different from 1; in addition, conditional on information being precise, the
different measures of fragility carry conditional multipliers ranging from 2 to 2.5.
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a higher chance of runs. In addition, the evidence provided in this paper is also consistent
with Holmstro¨m (2014)’s view of opacity, liquidity and panics.6
Overall, our results are generally consistent with our extension of Morris and Shin (2004),
as shown in Section 1.5.4 which evaluates the likelihood of the calibrated model to quali-
tatively reproduce our findings. We can interpret our results in light of their theory with
a simple example. First of all, in games with strategic complementarities, such as those
involving rollover risk or bank runs,7 each agent would like to mimic what other people
do because everyone benefits from coordinated actions. If information is relatively precise
agents receiving a bad signal believe that many others observe similar bad signals too (see
Figure 1.1). In such a situation, each individual believes that many agents are likely to stop
funding the bank, which makes him more likely to do the same. Therefore, when forecasts
are unfavorable, more precise information acts as a coordination device that amplifies the
size of a credit freeze.8
Importantly, from the point of view of identifying the causal effect of expectations and
dispersed beliefs on default risk, we introduce a novel set of instruments to tackle possible
endogeneity issues whereby shocks to default risk affect both current expectations and dis-
persion of beliefs. For instance, an unexpected increase in the default risk of a bank could
induce the manager to undertake risky projects in an attempt to “gamble for resurrection”;
6Dang et al. (2014) offer a similar rationale for why banks should be opaque.
7Brunnermeier (2009) argues that bank runs and rollover risk are incarnations of the same risk, which he
calls funding liquidity risk ; financial institutions face this risk when assets can be readily sold only at a
large discount and there is a maturity mismatch between short term or demandable funds and long term
assets, so that a lack of confidence can lead to the default of the entity.
8Note that, when the situation is reversed and agents expect a bank to perform well, more precise infor-
mation can dampen the size of the attack (see Figure 1.2).
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if forecasters internalize this possibility they will then revise upward both expected returns
on the bank’s assets and expected variance of returns. This would generate an upward bias
in the OLS estimates of the effects of both dispersion and market expectations on default
risk, which is indeed what we find; the difference between the IV and the OLS estimates is
also consistent with attenuation bias due to i.i.d. measurement error in both regressors.
Our instrumenting strategy goes beyond standard approaches in the Dynamic Panel Data
literature and exploits both internal and external instruments: the former are lagged en-
dogenous variables while the latter are lagged forecast errors. In a context where market
participants learn about the law of motion of banks’ fundamentals, previous forecast errors
are used to update parameters of the perceived law of motion (see Appendix A.2); indeed,
from first stage regressions we observe that past underestimations of banks’ profitability lead
to an upward adjustment of current forecasts. Finally, the exclusion restriction requires that
today’s CDS spreads are affected by today’s market expectations and that past expectations
affect CDS spreads only indirectly throughout the learning process. This is a reasonable
assumption to make, especially nowadays where market participants continuously process
new information to update their trading decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly reviews the related
literature, Section 1.3 presents our extension of Morris and Shin (2004)’ s model and derives
some new testable implications. Section 1.4 presents the data and discusses the empirical
strategy while Section 1.5 shows the empirical results and assesses the performance of the
model. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
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1.2. Related Literature
Our paper is mainly related to the Global Games literature that studies the impact of
incomplete information on financial crises. After Morris and Shin (2001)’s original contri-
bution, a lot of theoretical work has been done to understand if equilibrium uniqueness is
robust to alternative features of the model.9 However, before us, only Prati and Sbracia
(2010) tried to bring these models to the data by studying the role of dispersed information
on speculative pressures against currencies in the 1997-98 Asian crises.
Our work is also related to the finance literature studying the effect of noisy information
and disagreement on excess returns and credit spreads. Duffie and Lando (2001), Albagli,
Hellwig and Tsyvinski (2014) and Buraschi, Trojani and Vedolin (2013) focus on the term
structure of credit spreads under noisy information. Even though the models are different,
they all predict that greater noise or disagreement increases credit spreads and default
risk,10 which is in contrast with what we find in the data. Importantly, they do not consider
coordination motives among creditors, which instead is the focus of Morris and Shin (2004).
Empirically, Gu¨ntay and Hackbarth (2010) focus on non-financial firms in US from 1987 to
1998 and document a positive association between credit spreads and firm-specific measures
of disagreement in earnings forecasts. Differently from our paper, they do not account for
either any direct effect of expectations, or the endogeneity of forecast measures.
9Just to cite a few, Angeletos and Werning (2004) show that if public signals are endogenously provided
by financial markets precise private signals do not deliver uniqueness anymore; Angeletos, Hellwig and
Pavan (2006) show that signals conveyed by policy interventions lead to multiplicity; Angeletos, Hellwig
and Pavan (2007) consider the effect of learning in a dynamic version of the standard model.
10This is mainly due to a Jensen inequality effect: a mean preserving spread in the distribution of posterior
beliefs decreases bond prices and hence increases credit spreads due to the concavity of bond’s payoffs.
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Our paper is also linked to the literature studying the effect of fundamentals on default
risk and bank runs. Gorton (1988) examines the determinants of deposits withdrawals and
dismisses the sunspot view of panics. More recently, Calomiris and Mason (2003) show that
bank’s characteristics and regional level data explain a lot of default risk during the Great
Depression while panic indicators are largely insignificant. Closer to our work, Gorton and
Metrick (2012) study the anatomy of the 2007-2008 runs on repos and Covitz, Liang and
Suarez (2013) study the determinants of runs on Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP)
programs in 2007; both repos and ABCP are major sources of very short term funding for
financial institutions.
1.3. Model and Testable Implications
This section presents our extension of Morris and Shin (2004)’s model which is required
to bring the model to the data. Specifically, in the original paper the probability of a
bank defaulting is either zero or one once the signals are privately observed; this does
not allow to map the model to CDS spreads which measure the perceived probability of
default in a continuous fashion. In order to accommodate for this possibility we introduce a
“late realization” shock (τ) to perturb the default decision. We should think about bank’s
fundamentals as the sum of a predictable component, θ, and an unpredictable component,
τ . A large number of individually small risk-neutral creditors finances a project through a
collateralized debt contract. To capture the essence of rollover risk, it is assumed that in
stage one creditors decide whether to seize the loan and get the collateral, valued at λ < 1,
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or to roll-over the debt and go to stage two. In the second stage, they get the face value
of the debt contract, normalized to one, if the bank does not default or zero if the bank
defaults. The bank defaults if its fundamentals (θ + τ) are not large enough to cope with
the liquidity shortage (zl) induced by those creditors not rolling over short term debt; l is
the share of creditors not rolling over debt, which is endogenously determined, while the
parameter z measures the degree of disruption caused by the lack of coordination in rolling
over debt. We can think of z as being a function of the entity’s leverage. More precisely,
we assume that at stage two the bank defaults if θ + τ ≤ zl and succeeds otherwise. The
payoffs to a creditor are given by the following matrix:
Success Failure
zl < θ + τ zl ≥ θ + τ
Roll over 1 0
Foreclose λ λ
Complete Information. In the perfect information case, namely when θ is common
knowledge, and with τ = 0 the game is simple: if θ > z it is optimal to roll over the
loan, since default will not occur even when everybody else forecloses the loan; if, on the
other hand, θ < 0 it is always optimal to foreclose the loan as the bank will default even
when everyone else tries to keep the bank afloat. Finally, when θ belongs to the interval
(0, z), creditors face a coordination problem which leads to multiple equilibria: if each
creditor expects everyone else to roll over debt it is individually optimal to keep funding
9
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the bank; however, if each creditor expects everyone else to foreclose the loan, then the
optimal strategy is to foreclose the loan as well, thus liquidating a bank that would have
been otherwise solvent. This is analogous to the bank run scenario outlined in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983).
Incomplete Information. As Morris and Shin (2004) show, multiplicity disappears once
we depart from the assumption of common knowledge of the fundamental state θ; suppose
now that θ is normally distributed with mean y and variance 1/α (precision α). At the
beginning of stage 1, each creditor receives a private noisy signal xj of the predictable
component of fundamentals: xj = θ+ εj , where εj is normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance 1/β (precision β). Once observing the private signal, a creditor believes that the
posterior distribution of θ has mean ξj =
αy+βxj
α+β and precision α+β. In addition, the “late
realization” shock τ is known to be independent from both y and θ and normally distributed
with mean zero and precision γ and it is realized in stage two, after each creditor decides
whether or not to roll over debt.
Equilibrium. The equilibrium is a couple (x∗, ψ) such that a creditor forecloses the loan
if xj < x∗, where x∗ is the cutoff signal, and rolls over the loan if xj ≥ x∗; in addition, the
bank decides to default in stage two if θ + τ ≤ ψ and survives otherwise, where ψ = zl∗
is the equilibrium liquidity shortage and l∗ is the equilibrium share of foreclosers. Morris
and Shin (2004) prove that the equilibrium strategy is a switching strategy indeed. Given
the cutoff signal x∗, the share of creditors foreclosing the loan is then given by the mass of
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signals below x∗, namely
l = Φ(
√
β(x∗ − θ)) (1.1)
where Φ is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. The decision of whether or not
to roll over debt is taken at stage one, before τ is realized; thus the equilibrium liquidity
shortage ψ does not depend on τ . There exists a critical level of θ which in expectation
makes the bank indifferent between defaulting or not, given the information available at
stage one. The critical level of θ is such that
0 = E[θ + τ − zΦ(
√
β(x∗ − θ)) | θ] = θ − zΦ(
√
β(x∗ − θ)) (1.2)
This critical level of θ is the fixed point ψ, which is then implicitly defined by
ψ = zΦ(
√
β(x∗ − ψ)) (1.3)
Equation 1.3 specifies the equilibrium liquidity shortage ψ as a function of the cutoff signal
x∗. Note that the right-hand-side of equation 1.3 is continuous and monotonically decreasing
in ψ and takes values in the open interval (0, z). Thus, there exists a unique ψ that solves
equation 1.3 for a given x∗.
Moreover, a creditor who receives the cutoff signal x∗ will be, by definition, indifferent
between foreclosing and rolling over debt; the payoff from foreclosing is λ while that from
rolling over is Pr(θ + τ > ψ | xj = x∗). Conditional on receiving the signal x∗, θ + τ
11
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is normally distributed with mean ξ∗ and variance 1α+β +
1
γ =
α+β+γ
γ(α+β) . Therefore, this
indifference condition leads to
λ = Pr(θ + τ > ψ | xj = x∗) = 1− Φ
(√
γ(α+ β)√
α+ β + γ
(ψ − ξ∗)
)
(1.4)
where ξ∗ ≡ αy+βx∗α+β is the posterior expectation of θ formed by the agent who received x∗
as private signal. Thus, the definition of ξ∗, together with equation 1.4, leads to
x∗ =
α+ β
β
(
ψ + Φ−1(λ)
√
α+ β + γ√
γ(α+ β)
)
− α
β
y (1.5)
Finally, from equations 1.3 and 1.5 we have that
ψ = zΦ
(
α√
β
(ψ − y) +
√
α+ β
√
α+ β + γ√
βγ
Φ−1(λ)
)
(1.6)
which implicitly defines ψ as a function of the model’s parameters. Following Morris and
Shin (2004), equation 1.6 has a unique fixed point if its right-hand side has a slope of less
than one everywhere. This requires zφ(α/
√
β) < 1, where φ is the pdf of the standard
normal evaluated at the appropriate point. The previous condition is the same condition
that guarantees a unique solution in Morris and Shin (2004). Thus, their uniqueness The-
orem11 applies to our model as well. A sufficient condition for uniqueness is α√
β
<
√
2pi
z
(Assumption 1); this condition requires private signals to be precise enough relative to the
11See Theorem 1 in Morris and Shin (2004).
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underlying uncertainty. We assume that this condition is satisfied.
Without the introduction of the “late realization” shock τ we would go back to Morris
and Shin (2004)’s model and have the following implication: the probability of default
conditional on private signals is either one if θ ≤ ψ or zero if θ > ψ. In order to have a
continuum of possible default probabilities, we introduced the shock τ ; now we have that
the probability of default conditional on observing the median signal is
Pr(θ + τ < ψ | ξ) = Φ
(√
γ(α+ β)√
α+ β + γ
(ψ − ξ)
)
(1.7)
which we proxy by the CDS spread as described in Section 1.4.
We define P (def) ≡ Pr(θ + τ < ψ | ξ). ξ is the median12 posterior expectation of θ,
or alternatively the median forecast which is observable. Moreover, we also observe the
standard deviation of individual forecasts, δ. Since the individual forecast of a creditor
observing xj is ξj =
αy+βxj
α+β , we obtain that the variance of individual forecasts is
δ2 =
∫
(ξj − ξ)2 dj = β
2
(α+ β)2
∫
(xj − θ)2 dj = β(α+ β)2 (1.8)
Notice that an increase in the precision of public signals decreases dispersion of beliefs:
∂δ2
∂α = − 2β(α+β)3 < 0; in addition, under the assumption that β > α, we have that more
precise private information decreases dispersion of beliefs as well. Indeed, ∂δ
2
∂α =
(α−β)
(α+β)3
which is negative if and only if β > α. Therefore, under the working assumption, both
12Since a property of normal distributions is that the mean value is also the median value, ξ is both the
mean and the median expectation.
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more precise public and private signals decrease dispersion of beliefs. See Appendix A.3 for
a discussion on the impossibility to back out α and β from the data.
1.3.1. Comparative Statics
We are interested in understanding how the probability of default is affected by changes in
both median beliefs, ξ, and dispersion of beliefs, δ =
√
β
α+β . First of all, we study the effect
of ξ, β, α and z on P (def). By differentiating equation 1.7 we have that
dP (def)
dξ = −ηφ1
dP (def)
dβ = ηφ1
(
γ(ψ−ξ)
2(α+β)(α+β+γ) +
∂ψ
∂β
)
dP (def)
dα = ηφ1
(
γ(ψ−ξ)
2(α+β)(α+β+γ) +
∂ψ
∂α
)
dP (def)
dz = ηφ1
∂ψ
∂z
(1.9)
where η ≡
√
γ(α+β)√
α+β+γ
and φ1 is the pdf of the standard normal evaluated at η(ψ − ξ). The
partial derivatives of ψ with respect to β, α and z are found by applying the Implicit
Function Theorem to equation 1.6:
∂ψ
∂β = −
zφ2
»
ψ−y+
(
β2−α2−αγ√
γ(α+β)(α+β+γ)
)
Φ−1(λ)
–
2 3
√
β
“
1−zφ2 α√β
”
∂ψ
∂α =
zφ2
»
ψ−y+ 2α+2β+γ
2
√
γ(α+β)(α+β+γ)
Φ−1(λ)
–
√
β
“
1−zφ2 α√β
”
∂ψ
∂z =
ψ
z
“
1−zφ2 α√β
”
(1.10)
where φ2 is the pdf of the standard normal evaluated at α√β (ψ − y) +
√
α+β
√
α+β+γ√
βγ
Φ−1(λ).
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Next, we want to investigate how the effect of forecasts on default risk is affected by
both private and public signals’ precision and bank’s characteristics. To this regard, we
differentiate dP (def)dξ with respect to β, α and z respectively:
d2P (def)
dξdβ = ηφ1
[
η2
(
γ(ψ−ξ)2
2(α+β)(α+β+γ) + (ψ − ξ)∂ψ∂β
)
− γ2(α+β)(α+β+γ)
]
d2P (def)
dξdα = ηφ1
[
η2
(
γ(ψ−ξ)2
2(α+β)(α+β+γ) + (ψ − ξ)∂ψ∂α
)
− γ2(α+β)(α+β+γ)
]
d2P (def)
dξdz = η
3φ1
ψ(ψ−ξ)
z
“
1−zφ2 α√β
”
(1.11)
Proposition 1 More precise signals, either private or public, increase default risk when
expectations are not favorable and reduce it when forecasts are good enough.
dP (def)
dβ > 0 iff ξ < ξβ
dP (def)
dα > 0 iff ξ < ξα
(1.12)
All the proofs and thresholds’ definitions can be found in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 2 More favorable forecasts reduce default risk. Moreover, the impact of ex-
pectations on default risk is amplified by more precise signals, whether private or public, for
intermediate forecasts while it is dampened for either bad or great ones. More precisely,
dP (def)
dξ < 0
d2P (def)
dξdβ < 0 iff ξ ∈ [ξLβ , ξHβ]
d2P (def)
dξdα < 0 iff ξ ∈ [ξLα , ξHα]
(1.13)
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Proposition 3 Worse bank’s characteristics increase default risk. Moreover, the impact
of expectations on default risk is amplified by worse bank’s characteristics for good enough
forecasts only. More precisely,
dP (def)
dz > 0
d2P (def)
dξdz < 0 iff ξ > ψ
(1.14)
1.4. Data and Empirical Strategy
1.4.1. Data
The dataset used for the estimations combines banks’ CDS spreads (Markit), analysts’
earning forecast (Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System – IBES database), and balance-
sheet data (Bankscope Bureau van Dijk).
We use the CDS spreads as a measure of banks’ default risk.13 CDS spreads actually
embed both perceived probability of default and expected recovery rate. We factor out
the latter by controlling for net charge-offs, the share of non-performing loans over gross
loans, and the share of liquid assets over total assets, on top of bank and time fixed effects
(capturing persistent heterogeneities and homogeneous shocks in times of crisis).14
Analysts’ median forecasts on banks’ future performances are adopted to measure the me-
13We average across the 5-year daily CDS spreads on senior debt to obtain monthly series. The choice of
the maturity is entirely driven by data availability, and by the higher liquidity of this market. Moreover,
in order to be consistent with the timing of the surveys (see footnote 16), administered within the first
half of the month, we construct monthly CDS data disregarding the second half of the month.
14Upon default, the recovery rate will be larger the more liquid assets the bank has and the smaller the
ratio of non-performing loans over total loans.
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dian market expectation of banks’ fundamentals; for the sake of matching observables to
their theoretical counterparts, both mean and median expectations are appropriate coun-
terparts of ξ and we choose the latter to minimize the impact of outliers. Additionally,
we use the standard deviation of forecasters’ expectations (for each bank and each period)
because it is the empirical counterpart of the standard deviation of posterior beliefs, δ. The
last two pieces of data are obtained from IBES, which is a widely used survey of professional
forecasters.15 As a proxy for expected bank’s fundamentals we use one-year-ahead forecasts
on returns on assets (ROA).16 Finally, we control for bank-specific characteristics with a
rich set of balance-sheet ratios from Bankscope. Our final dataset covers about 190 banks
worldwide from 2005 to 2012 at monthly frequency (see Table 1.25 for a detailed list of the
banks in the sample).
Table 1.1 shows some correlations before and during the crisis; in the top and bottom
panels we use variables in levels while the middle panel displays correlations of first differ-
enced variables. While during the crisis CDS spreads are negatively associated with both
realized and expected returns on assets, it appears from the top panel that dispersion of
beliefs is positively associated with CDS spreads; however, by looking at the middle panel
we see that reductions in dispersion of beliefs are associated with increases in the CDS
15IBES is a widely used dataset in Finance; for instance, it has been used in Ajinkya and Gift (1985), Bartov
and Bodnar (1994) and more recently in Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) and Balduzzi and Lan
(2012).
16IBES surveys several professional forecasters within the first 15 days of every month asking for their
forecasts at different horizons on several key indicators, ROA, ROE and EPS included. The dataset
contains forecast horizons of one, two and three years ahead and long run forecasts; we end up using
one-year-ahead forecasts on ROA to limit the drop of observations and to ensure the highest explanatory
power.
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spread. Therefore, from this first look at the data we do not get a clear idea of the re-
lationship between default risk and dispersed information in times of crisis. The bottom
panel shows that the various measures of fragility we use later on are positively correlated:
higher leverage is associated with more unstable sources of funding, namely lower customer
deposits over total funding and lower net interbank positions.
Table 1.2 summarizes means and standard deviations of the main variables in the two
subperiods, namely pre-crisis (January 2005 to August 2007) and crisis (September 2007
to December 2012) and shows significant changes in the aftermath of the crisis, with both
level and volatility of banks’ CDS spreads that are about eight times larger than in normal
times, as portrayed in Figure 1.3. At first, explaining this eight-fold increase in CDS spreads
through dispersion of beliefs seems hard to accomplish. While from Figure 3.2 we can see
that expectations on future profitability follow the market perception of risk, Figure 3.3
does not display any clear cyclicality in the evolution of dispersed beliefs. However, we will
show that the interplay between expectations and dispersion of beliefs can explain quite a
lot of variation in banks’ CDS spreads. Notice also that the regression analysis uses bank
level data while Figures 1.3 to 3.3 use bank-level data aggregated across regions, namely
USA, PIIGS and Asia; this aggregation, while necessary for visualization purposes, hides
interesting variation.
1.4.2. Empirical Strategy
The evolution of banks’ CDS spreads in our baseline specification is modeled as follows:
18
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CDSi,t = ρCDSi,t−1 + γ1[Et(ROAi,t+1)(Precisei,t)] + γ2[Et(ROAi,t+1)(1− Precisei,t)]
+γ3δEi,t + β
>xi,t−1 + ηi + λt + εi,t
(1.15)
where CDSi,t is the monthly average of daily Credit Default Swap spreads of bank i at
time t. Et(ROAi,t+1) is the median of the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA
of bank i in t + 1. Precisei,t is an indicator function identifying precise information. At
each point in time, the information received by market participants is defined as “precise”
if the standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i is below the median (or the first tercile)
of its time-specific cross-sectional distribution.17 δEi,t is the standard deviation of analysts’
forecasts formed at time t on the ROA of bank i in t+ 1.
Finally, xi,t−1 is a rich vector of controls for banks’ fundamentals, ηi are bank-specific (CDS-
specific) fixed effects controlling for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time,
and λt are time fixed effects capturing common shocks and cyclical factors.
Our crisis regressions displayed in Tables 1.3 to 1.6 use data from September 2007 to De-
cember 2012; we use September 2007 as the starting period of the financial crisis.18 When
17The threshold value of the indicator for precise information is computed on a monthly basis instead
of over the full time period in order to have enough flexibility to recognize precision also in times of
generalized and increased uncertainty. Results are practically identical if the threshold that identifies
precise information is the median (or 33rd percentile) of either the full 2005-2012 sample or the crisis
period only.
18From Figure 4 in Gorton and Metrick (2012) it appears that the haircut rate on repos jumps up for
the first time in September 2007; large haircuts can be thought of as debt runs. Gorton and Metrick
(2012) also show that the first signals of danger in the interbank market (LIBOR-OIS spread) arrive in
August 2007. A very similar chronology of events is described in Brunnermeier (2009). Also, looking
at the ABCP market, see Panel A in Covitz, Liang and Suarez (2013), we notice a large collapse in the
outstanding value of ABCP around August-September 2007.
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we compare pre-crisis and crisis estimates as in Tables 1.7 and 1.8, we just allow all coeffi-
cients to have a structural break in September 2007.
If more precise information amplifies the reaction of CDS spreads to expected future prof-
itability we expect |γ1| > |γ2|; since the effect of expected profitability on default risk is
negative, this translates into γ1 < γ2. In addition, if more precise information has a negative
impact on default risk we expect γ3 < 0.
There are two main issues we have to address in order to identify the role of market ex-
pectations and dispersed information on default risk: simultaneity and omitted variables
biases.
Reverse Causality. Since we are interested in the causal effect of current expectations
on banks’ CDS spreads, we have to deal with problems of reverse causality: shocks to CDS
spreads could be observed by forecasters and thus internalized in their current expectations.
For instance, an unexpectedly large increase in the default probability of a bank could push
the institution to undertake very risky projects so as to get a chance to stay in business in
case the risk pays off.19 In this circumstance, the variance of future returns on assets is now
larger, and the associated risk premium could push the expected future ROA up as well.
Therefore, we could obtain an upward bias in the OLS estimate of the effect of expectations
on default risk, as it turns out to be the case (see Table 1.3). Moreover, if the additional
risk undertaken by the bank is internalized by forecasters the variance of posterior beliefs
would rise as well; thus, we also need to treat the dispersion of beliefs as an endogenous
19This is the “gamble for resurrection” story of Cheng and Milbradt (2011).
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regressor. Notice that not doing so would, according to this example, bias the OLS estimate
of the effect of dispersion on default risk upwards, as it turns out to be the case (see Table
1.3). The OLS biases are also consistent with the presence of i.i.d. measurement error in
forecast measures that yields attenuation bias. We can interpret i.i.d. measurement error as
random deviations of sample moments from the population moments of forecast measures
due to having a finite number of forecasters.
Instrumenting the lagged dependent variable (CDSi,t−1) with lags of its first difference,
while necessary in a small-T panel setting, is not needed here because we have a quite large
time dimension (T=64).20
Potentially endogenous variables are current expectations on banks’ future ROA and
the dispersion of forecasts. Our instrumenting set includes both internal and external
instruments; the use of internal instruments, i.e. lagged values of endogenous covariates is
a standard approach in the Dynamic Panel Data literature.21 In addition, we introduce a
novel set of instruments, whose validity stems from the theory of learning.
We believe that each market participant is uncertain about the data generating process of
banks’ fundamentals and thus engages in a learning process. Under bayesian learning, we
show (see Appendix A.2) that agents use previous forecast errors to correct and update their
estimates. Therefore, past forecast errors are in theory correlated with current expectations;
finally, the exclusion restriction requires that past forecast errors do not directly influence
20The so called Nickell bias, Nickell (1981), induced by the demeaning process through bank fixed effects
tends to vanish as the time dimension increases. Indeed, whether or not we instrument the lagged
dependent variable, the coefficients of interest are essentially unchanged.
21See for instance, Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998.
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today’s default risk. Since the forecast error is the difference between the realized measure
and its expectation formed one period in advance, we need to assume that the median
market participant engages in a process of learning and updates her beliefs at least once a
month, which is very reasonable in the current financial context.
Regarding the instrumentation of dispersion of beliefs, we show in Appendix A.2.1 that,
whenever the variance of fundamental innovations is unknown and priors are diffuse, the
expected value of this variance depends on its previous period expectation; since dispersion
of beliefs is a combination of the expected variance of both fundamental innovations and
private signals, this result proves that lags of dispersed beliefs are in theory correlated with
current values. This in turns rationalizes the choice of lags of δEi,t in the instrumenting set.
Moreover, in a world in which agents choose the precision of the signals they acquire, we
could imagine that past expectations and past forecast errors about the profitability of a
bank may impact the agents’ choice of signals’ accuracy. This would then motivate the use
of past expectations and forecast errors as instruments for current dispersion of beliefs.
We then test for the correlation of excluded instruments with the error term (Hansen
J-test of overidentifying restrictions), and we assess the power of our instruments (under-
identification test and F test of the excluded instruments in the first stage regressions).
Finally, the implement a test proposed in Godfrey (1994) to access whether or not the error
term is serially correlated; this is of particular relevance for our identification because the
use of lagged endogenous covariates as instruments is valid only in the presence of serially
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uncorrelated residuals.22 In all the regressions we reject the null of serial correlation of the
error term. Therefore, under the assumption that the instruments are correctly excluded
from the second stage regression our instrumenting strategy is internally consistent.
Omitted Variables. Regarding the set of controls, we cover a large spectrum of financial
ratios. xi is a vector of covariates accounting for realized profitability (return on average
assets, ROAA), leverage (total assets to common equity ratio), composition of funding
(deposits to total funding ratio), capitalization (tier1 capital ratio), liquidity (liquid to
total assets ratio), losses (net charge-offs to gross loans ratio), and impaired loans (non-
performing loans to gross loans ratio). In some specifications we also control for other
measures of capitalization, composition of funding, cost of funding, composition of loans,
roll-over risk, returns of equity, liquidity and bank size.23 All covariates are lagged once to
avoid simultaneity bias.
Notice that controlling for both leverage, namely total assets over equity, and Tier1 ratio,
namely equity over risk weighted assets, implicitly controls for the amount of risk undertaken
by the bank. Moreover, controlling for the previous realization of banks’ CDS spreads
virtually eliminates residual problems of omitted variables.
Finally, the econometric estimation is performed via two-stage GMM models with bank
22Godfrey proposes the test for time series data and we adapt it to a panel data setting by assuming that
the autoregressive coefficient of the error term is common across banks.
23More specifically, we introduce the following set of additional controls: total-capital ratio, deposits from
banks to total funding ratio, interest expenses to total funding ratio, short-term funding to total funding
ratio, short-term funding to long-term funding ratio, return on average equity (ROAE), cash from banks
to total funding ratio, deposits from customers to total funding ratio, loans to banks to total assets ratio,
total loans to total deposits ratio, liquid assets to total assets ratio, liquid assets to short-term funding
ratio (quick ratio), log of total assets, income to total assets ratio.
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and time fixed effects and White, heteroskedasticity-consistent, standard errors.
1.5. Results
1.5.1. Amplification: the indirect effect of dispersed beliefs
Table 1.3 shows the heterogeneous effect of market expectations on banks’ CDS spreads in
times of crisis. In every specification, expected profitability significantly affects the perceived
default probability of a financial institution, and its impact is greatly amplified when beliefs
are less dispersed. In other words, more concentrated beliefs increase the vulnerability of a
bank to changes in market expectations. These findings are consistent with dP (def)dξ < 0 and
d2P (def)
dξdβ < 0 or
d2P (def)
dξdα < 0 from Proposition 2. Details about each regression are reported
in the notes underneath the table. Regardless of the specific threshold used to identify
precise information, the results are consistent: during the crisis, more agreement among
forecasters amplifies the effect of expected profitability on the default risk of a financial
institution. Everything else equal, a one percent increase in expected ROA reduces the
CDS spread by 11 basis points if beliefs are dispersed and by 26 basis points in case they
are more concentrated; the two coefficients are statistically and economically significant,
and different from each other (with a p-value for the test γ1 = γ2 equal to 0.001 in column
2). Thus, precise information carries an unconditional multiplier of around 2.5. We call it
unconditional to differentiate it from the conditional multiplier which relates to the degree of
amplification attained once we restrict to a certain subset of banks, such as highly leveraged
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ones.
Next, we study whether certain bank’s characteristics amplify the reaction of default risk
to market expectations. To this regard, banks’ leverage, the share of customer deposits
to total funding, and the net interbank position may expose financial institutions to sig-
nificantly different degrees of fragility in times of crisis.24 While the first two measures of
fragility are well known in the literature, the net interbank position is, to our knowledge,
never been used before. We define the latter as loans to banks minus deposits from banks
divided by total assets. A negative value indicates that the bank is a net borrower of funds
from other banks. Prior to us, Calomiris and Mason (2003) showed that interbank deposits
were a powerful predictor of bank’s future distress during the Great Depression. Instead
of using interbank deposits which measures the total amount of funds borrowed from other
banks, we consider the net flow of funds vis a vis other banks. To us, this is a better measure
of liquidity risk because it captures the reliance on interbank liquidity in net terms: a bank
with some interbank deposits and an equally large amount of loans to other banks can, in
case of market illiquidity, withdraw its funds from other banks to cope with its liquidity
shortage; therefore, it is important to track its net position more than just the amount of
deposits from other banks.
Table 1.4 explores whether fragile banks are more sensitive to market expectations than
sound ones. Details about each regression are reported in the notes underneath the table.
As expected, a general pattern emerges whereby fragile institutions are more sensitive to
24By fragility and vulnerability we mean larger sensitivity to shocks.
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market expectations than sound banks in times of crisis. This is especially true in column 1
where market expectations on future profitability have a large impact on highly leveraged
institutions and no sizable effect on more capitalized banks.25 Finally, it is worth emphasiz-
ing that the degree of amplification originated by greater fragility is lower than that coming
from more precise information, which is shown in Table 1.3. In other words, the largest
unconditional multiplier is achieved by more precise information, not by higher leverage
or by more unstable sources of funding. All together, the fact that fragility increases the
sensitivity of CDS spreads to expectations is consistent with d
2P (def)
dξdz < 0 in Proposition 3.
Next, Table 1.5 blends in the two sources of amplification highlighted so far by simultane-
ously accounting for different degrees of fragility and dispersion of beliefs. It is evident that
market expectations affect CDS spreads the most when the bank is fragile and forecasts
are less dispersed. This finding is robust to the different definitions of fragility we consider,
whether it is high leverage, low deposits over total funding or low net interbank positions.
Across all dimensions of fragility, the sensitivity of default risk to market expectations is 3.5
to 5.5 times larger when information about fragile banks is precise rather than imprecise; on
the other hand, conditional on information being precise, the effect of market expectations
on CDS spreads for fragile banks about twice as big as the one for sound institutions. In
other words, the conditional multiplier of precise information ranges from 3.5 to 5.5 whereas
the conditional multipliers of various fragility measures lie between 2 and 2.5. The two sets
of multipliers are both economically and statistically significant as the tests at the bottom
25This is in a way reminiscent of Calomiris and Gorton (1991)’s finding that bad news together with high
leverage are necessary for banking panics.
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of Table 1.5 show.26 Moreover, these findings are robust to different specifications of the
time fixed effects and different thresholds for fragility and information precision, as shown
in the robustness checks (see Section 1.5.6).
Once again, less dispersion of beliefs plays a key role in amplifying the effect of market
expectations on default risk. In addition, the findings that more precise information carries
the largest multipliers suggest that the degree of information precision should be closely
monitored by Central Banks and its determinants better understood at both theoretical
and empirical levels.
1.5.2. The direct effect of dispersed beliefs
We still have to assess whether dispersion of beliefs has a strong first order effect on CDS
spreads in addition to the amplifying role documented so far. This is what we accomplish
in this section: Table 1.6 shows that, during the crisis, less dispersion of beliefs (lower δEi,t)
drastically increases CDS spreads especially when forecasts are unfavorable; this is consis-
tent with Proposition 1 regardless of whether changes in dispersion come from variation in
the precision of public or private signals. Indeed, Proposition 1 states that lower dispersion
of beliefs, either coming from a higher α or β, increases default risk if and only if the median
forecast is low enough.
26The coefficients for precise information and fragile banks are statistically different from both those en-
tailing imprecise information about fragile banks, and those concerning precise information about sound
institutions. We also tried alternative definition of fragility based upon capitalization (tier-1 capital
ratio), liquidity (liquid assets to total assets ratio), losses (net-charge-offs to total assets ratio), composi-
tion of funding (deposits from banks to total funding), and rollover risk (short-term funding to long-term
funding ratio). Results are mostly coherent even though the degrees of amplification induced by fragility
are less pronounced than those presented in the paper.
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Column 1 considers forecasts to be bad if expected future profitability belongs to the lowest
quartile while in column 2 they are regarded as bad if expected future ROAA is in the
bottom 10% of its time-specific empirical distribution.
The second column of Table 1.6 shows that, when expectations about future profitability
are bad, more precise information (less dispersion in beliefs) greatly increases default risk:
a one standard deviation decrease in dispersion of beliefs leads to an increase of the CDS
spread by 201 basis points, which is 84% of a standard deviation of CDS spreads during the
crisis period. The negative impact of precise information on default risk is robust to the
inclusion of a richer set of time-region or time-country fixed effects,27 as shown in Section
1.5.6.
Once again, we can interpret the negative effect of dispersion as evidence that precise infor-
mation acts as a coordination device that aligns creditors’ actions towards not rolling over
debt to the bank under consideration, thus increasing its probability of default.
Finally, it is important to stress that the negative impact of more concentrated beliefs
on default risk is consistent with incomplete information models that focus on coordination
motives among creditors, such as Morris and Shin (2004), while in contrast with models
that only capture the Jensen inequality effect of dispersed information; this last effect refers
to how a mean preserving spread in posterior beliefs increases the probability of default
and, due to the concavity of bond’s payoffs, produces larger credit spreads.
27The effect of dispersion of beliefs when forecasts are unfavorable is even larger when we use quarter-region
fixed effects while smaller when country-month fixed effects are introduced.
28
1. The Role of Dispersed Information in Pricing Default: Evidence from the Great Recession
1.5.3. Before and During the Crisis
Next, we discuss similarities and differences in the effect of dispersed information before
and during the financial crisis. Tables 1.7 shows that the amplifying role of more precise
information is also at work in the pre-crisis period; indeed, the hypothesis that the effect
of expectations is the same whether or not information is precise is rejected at the 5%
level. However, it appears that the marginal effect of forecasts on default risk is smaller in
magnitude in the pre-crisis period than during the crisis. Table 1.8 shows that in the pre-
crisis period the amplification due to fragility is larger than that due to precise information,
whereas we have shown the opposite to be true during the crisis. Notice also that, prior to
the crisis, the direct effect of dispersion is never significant, even at the 10% level.
Next, Table 1.9 investigates whether this last result could mask some heterogeneity in
the direct effect of dispersion on default risk; we therefore allow for this effect to depend
on whether median forecasts are favorable or not. The last column shows that, when the
bank is expected to perform poorly, the direct effect of dispersion is negative as it is the
case during the crisis; however, the effect is much smaller than the one estimated during
the crisis. Most importantly, when forecasts are favorable enough, the direct effect turns
out to be positive contrarily to what is the case during the crisis. This suggests that
when a bank is expected to perform well, debt is largely informationally insensitive and
greater dispersion slightly increases default risk, i.e. the Jensen inequality effect prevails;
however, when a bank is expected to enter into a danger zone, debt becomes much more
sensitive to information, coordination motives among creditors become very important and
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less dispersion increases default risk.28
It is important to notice however that the pre-crisis regressions in Table 1.9 suffer from
weak instruments, thus undermining the overall reliability of these pre-crisis estimates.
1.5.4. Assessment of the model’s performance
In this section we assess the likelihood that our extension of Morris and Shin (2004)’s
model would deliver results that are consistent with our empirical findings. Specifically,
we compute the probability that dP (def)dβ > 0,
dP (def)
dα > 0,
d2P (def)
dξdβ < 0,
d2P (def)
dξdα < 0 and
d2P (def)
dξdz < 0 for different calibrations of the model. We set the priors on the fundamental
state to be normally distributed with mean y = 0.8 and precision α = 10 and we set the
precision of private signals to be large enough so as to satisfy Assumption 1 for all the
calibrations; specifically β = κ (αz¯)
2
2pi with κ = 1.2 and z¯ being the largest value of z in
the simulations. Moreover, the precision of the late realization shock is set to γ = 2α.
Next, we allow z and λ to take different values so as to encompass many scenarios: z ∈
{0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 0.95} and λ ∈ {0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 0.95}. While we can interpret λ as the recovery
rate upon default, z has no direct counterpart, but it can be transformed to yield a measure
of leverage. Indeed, leverage, being the ratio of total assets to equity, is equal to 1/(1−z), so
that the sequence of z implies the following sequence of leverage: 2, 3.3¯, 10, 20. For each of
the sixteen combinations we numerically find the corresponding value of ψ and then obtain
from Propositions 1, 2, 3 the intervals in which the derivatives of interest have the signs
28The positive effect of dispersion on default risk is in line with what Gu¨ntay and Hackbarth (2010) find
and indeed they look at a time period, 1987-1998, which was not characterized by major financial unrest.
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reported above. Then, for each calibration we compute the probability that the posterior
mean (ξ) falls within the wanted intervals, as reported in Tables 1.11 to 1.15. Finally, Table
1.16 reports the conditional probability of default generated by each calibration to have
a sense of the scenario that each calibration entails. It appears that high probabilities of
default are generated when both leverage and recovery rates are high.
The Direct Effect. Table 1.11 shows that the model is capable of generating the negative
impact of concentrated beliefs on default risk when the recovery rate is larger than 0.5.
Indeed, if this is the case, the probability that market forecasts fall within the interval that
generates dP (def)dβ > 0 is 99% in all cases but one. Interestingly, the cases in which more
precision increases default risk are those in which the conditional probability of default is
non-negligible, which seems to be the case in the data as well.
The Indirect Effect. Table 1.13 shows that the range of values of ξ that deliver the
amplifying role of dispersed information is so large that the conditions for amplification are
very likely across various calibrations: the probability that d
2P (def)
dξdβ < 0 is very high for all
cases but those involving a low recovery rate (λ = 0.5). Also note from Table 1.15 that
fragility has the amplifying effect that we find in the data.
The Anomaly of the Recovery Rate. The only noticeable anomaly generated by the
model is that high probabilities of default are due to very high recovery rates upon default
which is in contrast with common sense; indeed, we believe that failures tend to happen
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exactly when recovery rates are low. However, it is also clear why the model yields such a
result: from the payoff matrix we can see that an increase in λ makes the foreclose action
more profitable, thus increasing the share of creditors not rolling over debt (l increases)
which leads to a higher probability of default. This is also corroborated by the fact that
dP (def)
dλ =
zηφ1φ2
√
(α+β)(α+β+γ)
φ(Φ−1(λ))(1−zφ2α/
√
β)
√
βγ
> 0.
This could be potentially amended by making the payoff from foreclosing the loan a negative
function of the share of creditors attacking the bank, l; indeed, Eisenbach (2013) allows for
the liquidation value to be endogenously determined in a global game model of rollover
risk and obtains that banks’ defaults are more likely in the bad state in which the assets’
liquidation value is lower.
1.5.5. Learning from forecast errors
In what follows we assess the power of our novel instruments by documenting the impact
of past forecast errors on current expectations. Forecast errors are defined as the difference
between the current (realized) value of ROA and last period expectation of it: FEt ≡ ROAt
- Et−1(ROAt). The theory of learning establishes a tight link between current expectations
and past forecast errors as we show in Appendix A.2: as agents learn about the structural
parameters governing the evolution of banks’ fundamentals, past forecast errors help agents
to adjust their expectations. However, there is very little theoretical work to guide us in
understanding how dispersion of beliefs evolves over time. Appendix A.2.1 shows that,
if we allow agents to learn about the variance of fundamental innovations and priors are
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diffuse, past expectations of the variance affect the current expectation. This is the sim-
plest framework that allows for dispersion of beliefs to have some dynamics, but the story
could be more involved once agents can costly choose the precision of private information.
Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), Myatt and Wallace (2012) and Chahrour (2012) study the
endogenous choice of information acquisition in static Global Games; however, to the best
of our knowledge there is no work on the interplay of signal acquisition and learning in
a dynamic context. We can still reasonably expect agents to react to past mistakes by
adjusting the precision with which they currently acquire information. We then allow for
both past forecast errors and past squared forecast errors to affect the choice of information
acquisition in the current period.
Table 1.10 shows a baseline specification which is similar to the first stage regression of
the models estimated in Table 1.3; in the actual first stage regressions we do not include
lagged squared forecast errors, we usually have more lags of excluded instruments and the
dependent variable itself is not just the current forecast but its interaction with the precision
indicator or the fragility indicator. The results show a significant autoregressive component
for both expectations and dispersion of beliefs, together with a strong effect of past forecast
errors. Notice that positive errors correspond by definition to past underestimations of
current profitability. If a bank turns out to be more profitable than expected, current
expectations tend to be adjusted upward. On the other hand, past underestimations predict
less dispersion of beliefs in the subsequent period or, more intuitively, agents tend to agree
more once they have been positively surprised. Finally, notice that lagged squared forecast
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errors do not significantly affect current dispersion of beliefs during the crisis.
1.5.6. Robustness Checks
In this section we reproduce the main results of the paper by allowing for more heterogeneity
in time fixed effects (Tables 1.17 to 1.23) and by changing the thresholds that identify fragile
banks (Table 1.23) and precise information (Table 1.24). The purpose of adopting different
thresholds for fragility and precision of information is to show that, consistently across all
specifications, the conditional multiplier of precise information is larger than each of the
conditional multipliers due to the various measures of bank’s fragility.
Alternative specification for time fixed effects. While the main regressions so far
adopt time fixed effects that are common to all banks worldwide, Tables 1.17 to 1.19 allow
for the time fixed effect to vary depending on the geographical region in which each bank is
headquartered. To this purpose we identify four main regions: North America, Eurozone,
Asia and the rest of the world.29 Due to problems in inverting the variance-covariance
matrix with month-region or month-country fixed effects, we decide to use quarter-region
fixed effects.
Lastly, in order to control for country-month fixed effects without incurring in the non-
invertibility of the variance-covariance matrix, we demean each variable in use by subtract-
ing its time and country-specific mean from it; practically, instead of using Xi,j,t which
29North America includes Canada and USA. The Eurozone includes the EU countries that have adopted
the common currency: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.
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denotes variable X for bank i in country j at time t, we use xi,t = Xi,j,t − X¯j,t, where
X¯j,t =
∑
i∈j Xi,j,t. Results obtained with country-month demeaned variables are shown in
Tables 1.20 to 1.23.
Alternative threshold for fragility. In Table 1.23 we identify a bank as fragile if it
belongs to the top 25% of the time specific distribution of leverage or to the bottom 25% of
the time specific distribution of both the customer deposits to total funding ratio and the
net interbank position.
Alternative threshold for precision. In Table 1.24 we identify information about a
bank to be precise if the dispersion of forecasts about that bank’s future profitability is
below the 25th percentile of the time specific distribution.
1.6. Conclusion
In the aftermath of the recent crisis, both level and volatility of banks’ CDS spreads expe-
rienced an eightfold increase. This work shows that market expectations and dispersion of
beliefs play a crucial role in explaining banks’ default risk. Specifically, the reaction of CDS
spreads to market expectations is amplified when beliefs are less dispersed; importantly,
the multiplier of precise information turns out to be larger than any multiplier carried by
various measures of bank’s fragility, suggesting that the primary factor that enhances vul-
nerability among financial institutions is the degree of information precision.
In addition, dispersion of beliefs has a large direct effect on default risk as well. When
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forecasts are unfavorable, a one-standard-deviation drop in the dispersion of beliefs leads
to an increase in the CDS spread that ranges from 104 to 201 basis points, which is be-
tween 43% and 83% of a standard deviations of CDS spreads during the crisis. However,
this effect is at large not statistically significant before the unfolding of the crisis and, in a
few cases, mildly positive and significant only at the 10% level; this suggests that debt is
largely informationally insensitive in normal times but it becomes sensitive to information
once creditors fear about a financial collapse; in this scenario, coordination motives among
creditors become very important and less dispersion greatly increases default risk.
The finding that more precise information increases default risk is in line with dispersed
information models that focus on coordination motives among creditors, such as Morris and
Shin (2004), Rochet and Vives (2004) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), while in contrast
with other models that rely solely on the Jensen inequality effect of dispersion. Overall, our
empirical results suggest that, under certain conditions, precise information act as a coordi-
nation device that reduces creditors’ willingness to roll over debt to a financial institution,
hence increasing both its default risk and its vulnerability to changes in market expecta-
tions. Future research should aim at better understanding the determinants of dispersion
of beliefs at both theoretical and empirical levels. Moreover, our results suggest that the
stability of the banking system can be improved in possibly two ways. First, by monitoring
the evolution of bank-specific measures of dispersion of beliefs, central banks can target liq-
uidity support especially to banks about which forecasters hold more homogeneous beliefs.
Second, in times of crisis, stability of the banking system can be improved by reducing the
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degree of information precision, similarly to what the first U.S. clearinghouses used to do
during panics, as described in Gorton (1985).
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Table 1.1.: Correlations
Precrisis (t < 2007Q4) Crisis (t ≥ 2007Q4)
CDSt δEt Et(ROA) ROAt CDSt δEt Et(ROA) ROAt
CDSt 1 1
δEt 0.06*** 1 0.21*** 1
Et(ROA) 0.06*** 0.48*** 1 -0.17*** 0.16*** 1
ROAt -0.13*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 1 -0.33*** -0.05*** 0.26*** 1
∆CDSt ∆δEt ∆Et(ROA) ∆ ROAt ∆CDSt ∆δEt ∆Et(ROA) ∆ROAt
∆CDSt 1 1
∆δEt -0.00 1 -0.12*** 1
∆Et(ROA) -0.00 -0.14*** 1 -0.08*** -0.03*** 1
∆ROAt 0.06*** -0.02 0.05*** 1 -0.05*** 0.00 0.01 1
δEt Levt (CD/TF)t IntBt δEt Levt (CD/TF)t IntBt
δEt 1 1
Levt -0.11*** 1 -0.02* 1
(CD/TF)t -0.03 -0.35*** 1 -0.03*** -0.09*** 1
IntBt 0.02 -0.07*** 0.48*** 1 -0.10*** -0.01 0.41*** 1
Notes: correlations for the banks in the sample. CDS is average of daily CDS spreads across the month.
Et(ROA) is the median of the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. δEt is
the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts formed on at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. ROA is
the realized return on average assets of bank i at time t. Lev is leverage (total assets to common equity),
CD/TF is customer deposits over total funding ratio and IntB is the net interbank position (loans to bank
− deposits from banks). The ∆ symbol in front of each variable is the first difference operator. ***,**,*
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 1.2.: Summary Statistics
Precrisis (t < 2007Q4) Crisis (t ≥ 2007Q4)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. # obs. Mean Std. Dev. # obs.
CDSt 48.891 28.855 8682 381.613 240.394 10702
δEt 0.269 0.938 6383 0.279 1.000 8954
Et(ROAt+1) 1.473 0.944 9441 1.011 0.887 10797
ROAt 1.346 0.666 6152 0.285 2.434 17143
Levt 23.26 27.82 5881 20.43 66.04 13187
(CD/TF)t 0.604 0.242 4933 0.604 0.243 11469
IntBt -0.016 0.104 4356 -0.024 0.111 10026
Notes: summary statistics for the banks in the sample. CDS is average of daily CDS spreads across the
month. Et(ROAt+1) is the median of the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA of bank i in t+ 1.
δEt is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts formed on at time t on the ROA of bank i in t+ 1. ROA
is the realized return on average assets of bank i at time t. Lev is leverage (total assets to common equity),
CD/TF is customer deposits over total funding ratio and IntB is the net interbank position (loans to bank
− deposits from banks).
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Table 1.3.: The effect of expectations and precision
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Sep 2007 - Dec 2012.
Precise if δ < p(50) Precise if δ < p(33)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -9.498** -26.37*** -11.49** -25.09***
[4.772] [7.515] [5.336] [8.516]
1(Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -7.492** -11.53* -7.455** -10.33*
[3.497] [5.894] [3.496] [5.737]
δEi,t -1.282 -11.66** -1.304 -10.71*
[2.085] [5.874] [2.081] [5.668]
CDSi,t−1 0.938*** 0.929*** 0.938*** 0.933***
[0.031] [0.029] [0.031] [0.030]
Bank + Time FE yes yes yes yes
IV no yes no yes
# obs. 3343 3052 3343 3052
R2 0.881 0.880 0.881 0.880
p-val of Hansen stat 0.832 0.502
p-val of Underid. test 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 24.76 35.48
p-val of Godfrey test 0.278 0.241
Tests (p-values)
1(Pret) = 1(Imprt) 0.518 0.001 0.328 0.010
Notes: within estimator (columns 1 and 3) and two-step GMM estimator (columns 2, and 4) with time and
bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variable is bank CDS spread at time t, defined as the monthly
average of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAi,t+1) is the median of the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t
on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. δEi,t is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts formed on at time
t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. 1(Pret) is an indicator function identifying precise signals. 1(Pret)
takes unitary value if the standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i is below the median (in columns 1
and 2), or the 25th percentile (in columns 3 and 4), of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Imprt)
identifies imprecise signals defined as 1(Imprt) = 1 − 1(Pret). Instrumented regressors in columns 2 and
4: 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t . Set of instruments in columns 2 and 4: lags of
1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t and forecast errors lagged once or more. Additional
controls: , actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital ratioi,t−1, net
charge-offs to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1. Robust standard errors
in brackets. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.4.: The effect of expectations and fragility
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Sep 2007 - Dec 2012.
Fragility
Leverage Customer dep. Interbank
(1) (2) (3)
1(Fragilet)Et(ROAi,t+1) -17.62*** -13.91** -13.75**
[6.742] [6.417] [5.721]
1(Soundt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -6.065 -10.09* -8.284
[6.085] [5.190] [6.095]
δEi,t -12.25** -7.517 -9.546*
[5.261] [5.213] [5.383]
CDSi,t−1 0.939*** 0.942*** 0.943***
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
# obs 3017 3017 3017
R2 0.880 0.879 0.880
p-val of Hansen stat 0.646 0.532 0.612
p-val of Underid. test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 20.77 46.53 88.67
p-val of Godfrey test 0.282 0.344 0.342
Tests (p-values)
1(Soundt) = 1(Fragilet) 0.077 0.266 0.190
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variable is bank
CDS spread at time t, defined as the monthly average of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAi,t+1) is the median
of the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA of bank i in t+ 1. δEi,t is the standard deviation of
analysts’ forecasts formed on at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. 1(Fragilet) is an indicator function
identifying fragile banks. 1(Fragilet) takes unitary value if banks’ measure of structural solidity is below
the median of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Soundt) identifies sound banks and is defined
as 1(Soundt) = 1 − 1(Fragilet). Fragility measures vary across columns: leverage (total assets to common
equity) in column 1, customer deposits to total funding ratio in column 2, and net exposure towards other
banks (loans to banks – deposits from banks) to total assets ratio in column 3. Instrumented regressors:
1(Fragilet)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Soundt)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t . Set of instruments: lags of 1(Fragilet)Et(ROAt+1),
1(Soundt)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t and forecast errors lagged once or more. Additional controls: , actual
ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital ratioi,t−1, net charge-offs to gross
loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1 and the lag of the variable used in the definition
of fragility. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively.
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Table 1.5.: The effect of expectations, precision and fragility
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Sep 2007 - Dec 2012.
Fragility
Leverage Customer dep. Interbank
(1) (2) (3)
1(Fragilet, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -36.63*** -36.86*** -30.88***
[10.02] [10.88] [10.48]
1(Fragilet, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -10.47 -6.750 -7.813
[7.781] [7.620] [6.826]
1(Soundt, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -15.75** -14.26* -14.10*
[6.961] [7.972] [8.188]
1(Soundt, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -8.396 -5.084 -4.000
[6.516] [6.116] [6.950]
δEi,t -12.47** -10.77* -11.41*
[6.252] [6.065] [6.058]
CDSi,t−1 0.937*** 0.933*** 0.931***
[0.028] [0.030] [0.030]
Bank + Time FE yes yes yes
IV yes yes yes
# obs. 3017 3052 3052
R2 0.880 0.880 0.881
p-val of Hansen stat 0.520 0.736 0.740
p-val of Underid. test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 12.36 20.53 24.32
p-val of Godfrey test 0.365 0.357 0.352
Tests (p-values)
1(Fragilet, Pret) = 1(Fragilet, Imprt) 0.013 0.001 0.006
1(Fragilet, Pret) = 1(Soundt, Pret) 0.012 0.015 0.052
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variable is bank
CDS spread at time t, defined as the monthly average of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAt+1) is the median
of the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. δEt is the standard deviation
of analysts’ forecasts formed on at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. 1(Pret) is an indicator function
identifying precise signals. 1(Pret) takes unitary value if the standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i
is below the median of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Imprt) identifies imprecise signals defined
as 1(Imprt) = 1 − 1(Pret). 1(Fragilet) is an indicator function identifying fragile banks. 1(Fragilet) takes
unitary value if banks’ measure of structural solidity is below the median of its cross-sectional distribution in
time t. 1(Soundt) identifies sound banks and is defined as 1(Soundt) = 1− 1(Fragilet). Fragility measures
vary across columns: leverage (total assets to common equity) in column 1, customer deposits to total
funding ratio in column 2, and net exposure towards other banks (loans to banks − deposits from banks)
to total assets ratio in column 3. Instrumented regressors: 1(Fragilet)⊗1(Preciset)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t .
Set of instruments: lags of 1(Fragilet)⊗1(Preciset)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t and forecast errors lagged once or
more. Additional controls: , actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital
ratioi,t−1, net charge-offs to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1 and the
lag of the variable used in the definition of fragility. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.6.: The direct effect of dispersion of beliefs
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Sep 2007 - Dec 2012.
Badt: Et(ROAi,t+1)< p(25) Badt: Et(ROAi,t+1)< p(10)
(1) (2)
1(Badt)δEi,t -104.89*** -201.04**
[40.00] [84.46]
1(Goodt)δEi,t -7.952 -12.00**
[4.965] [5.597]
1(Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -36.07*** -33.78***
[10.47] [11.30]
1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1) -20.49** -18.91*
[9.058] [10.05]
CDSi,t−1 0.941*** 0.963***
[0.028] [0.029]
Bank + Time FE yes yes
IV yes yes
# obs 2967 2998
R2 0.881 0.883
p-val of Hansen stat 0.992 0.988
p-val of Underid. test 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 17.55 22.58
p-val of Godfrey test 0.883 0.323
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variable is bank
CDS spread at time t, defined as the monthly average of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAi,t+1) is the median
of the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. δEi,t is the standard deviation
of analysts’ forecasts formed on at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. 1(Pret) is an indicator function
identifying precise signals. 1(Pret) takes unitary value if the standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i
is below the median of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Imprt) identifies imprecise signals defined
as 1(Imprt) = 1−1(Pret). 1(Badt) is an indicator function identifying bad forecasts. 1(Badt) takes unitary
value if the forecasted ROA of bank i at time t is below the 25th (column 1) or the 10th (column 2) of its cross-
sectional distribution in time t. 1(Goodt) identifies good forecasts and is defined as 1(Goodt) = 1−1(Badt).
Instrumented regressors: 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Badt)δEi,t and 1(Goodt)δEi,t . Set of
instruments: lags of 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Badt)δEi,t and 1(Goodt)δEi,t and forecast
errors lagged once or more. Additional controls: , actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding
ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital ratioi,t−1, net charge-offs to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross
loans ratioi,t−1. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively.
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Table 1.7.: The effect of expectations and precision before and during the crisis
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Jan 2005 - Dec 2012.
Precise if δ < p(50) Precise if δ < p(33)
(1) (2)
Crisis
1(Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -23.54*** -22.35***
[6.655] [7.581]
1(Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -10.78** -10.14**
[5.256] [5.120]
δEi,t -10.37* -9.734*
[5.708] [5.548]
Pre-crisis
1(Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -13.09** -15.76**
[6.667] [7.053]
1(Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -4.243 -5.213
[5.466] [5.685]
δEi,t -6.617 -12.69
[17.64] [17.12]
Bank + Time FE yes yes
IV yes yes
# obs. 3552 3552
R2 0.903 0.903
p-val of Hansen stat 0.711 0.554
p-val of Underid. test 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 17.23 19.01
p-val of Godfrey test 0.279 0.300
Tests (p-values)
Pre-crisis: 1(Pret) = 1(Imprt) 0.043 0.020
1(Before,Pret) = 1(After,Pret) 0.148 0.414
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variable is bank
CDS spread at time t, defined as the monthly average of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAi,t+1) is the median of the
analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA of bank i in t+1. δEi,t is the standard deviation of analysts’
forecasts formed on at time t on the ROA of bank i in t+1. 1(Pret) is an indicator function identifying precise
signals. 1(Pret) takes unitary value if the standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i is below the median
(in column 1), or the 25th percentile (in column 2), of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Imprt)
identifies imprecise signals defined as 1(Imprt) = 1−1(Pret). Instrumented regressors: 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1),
1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t . Set of instruments: lags of 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1) and
δEi,t and forecast errors lagged once or more. Additional controls: , actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit
to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital ratioi,t−1, net charge-offs to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing
loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.8.: The effect of expectations, precision and fragility before and during the crisis
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Jan 2005 - Dec 2012.
Fragility
Leverage Customer dep. Interbank
(1) (2) (3)
Crisis
1(Fragilet, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -39.50*** -36.82*** -28.71***
[10.36] [10.27] [9.169]
1(Fragilet, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -9.903 -10.59 -10.96*
[8.073] [6.516] [6.028]
1(Soundt, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -15.60** -13.95** -15.79**
[6.718] [6.852] [7.273]
1(Soundt, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -7.900 -7.352 -7.416
[6.074] [5.163] [5.866]
δEi,t -11.61* -9.795* -10.82*
[6.187] [5.905] [5.915]
Pre-crisis
1(Fragilet, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -50.06*** -32.88** -21.25**
[16.12] [13.39] [9.771]
1(Fragilet, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -17.01* -23.47** -5.637
[9.003] [11.50] [6.125]
1(Soundt, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -5.827 1.901 -6.591
[6.467] [8.047] [8.121]
1(Soundt, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) 0.497 4.657 -2.566
[5.481] [5.600] [6.974]
δEi,t -45.89 18.09 -4.761
[28.75] [23.46] [20.31]
Bank + Time FE yes yes yes
IV yes yes yes
# obs. 3552 3552 3552
R2 0.903 0.903 0.903
p-val of Hansen stat 0.427 0.350 0.335
p-val of Underid. test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 12.21 11.45 12.75
p-val of Godfrey test 0.243 0.269 0.275
Tests (p-values)
Pre-crisis: 1(Fragilet, Pret) = 1(Fragilet, Imprt) 0.003 0.378 0.079
Pre-crisis: 1(Fragilet, Pret) = 1(Soundt, Pret) 0.001 0.014 0.148
1(After,Fragt, Pret) = 1(Before,Fragt, Pret) 0.525 0.784 0.505
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variable is bank CDS
spread at time t, defined as the monthly average of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAt+1) is the median of the analysts’
forecasts formed at time t on the ROA of bank i in t+ 1. δEt is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts formed
on at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. 1(Pret) is an indicator function identifying precise signals. 1(Pret)
takes unitary value if the standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i is below the median of its cross-sectional
distribution in time t. 1(Imprt) is defined as 1(Imprt) = 1− 1(Pret). 1(Fragilet) is an indicator function identifying
fragile banks. 1(Fragilet) takes unitary value if banks’ measure of structural solidity is below the median of its
cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Soundt) is defined as 1(Soundt) = 1 − 1(Fragilet). Fragility measures vary
across columns: leverage (total assets to common equity) in column 1, customer deposits to total funding ratio
in column 2, and net exposure towards other banks (loans to banks – deposits from banks) to total assets ratio
in column 3. Instrumented regressors: 1(Fragilet)⊗1(Preciset)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t . Set of instruments: lags of
1(Fragilet)⊗1(Preciset)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t and forecast errors lagged once or more. Additional controls: , actual
ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital ratioi,t−1, net charge-offs to gross loans
ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1 and the lag of the variable used in the definition of fragility.
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.9.: The effect of expectations and precision before the crisis
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Jan 2005 - Aug 2007.
Badt: Et(ROAi,t+1)< p(25) Badt: Et(ROAi,t+1)< p(10)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(Badt)δEi,t 1.708 2.173 -3.038 -25.92**
[4.171] [9.672] [3.943] [12.81]
1(Goodt)δEi,t -3.259 -8.737 1.091 23.2*
[6.824] [9.998] [5.935] [13.80]
1(Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) 2.576 2.276 1.599 -3.762
[1.642] [4.166] [1.716] [4.080]
1(Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) 2.904* 2.387 1.734 -5.388
[1.533] [3.402] [1.708] [3.363]
CDSi,t−1 0.642*** 0.624*** 0.646*** 0.653***
[0.056] [0.053] [0.056] [0.050]
Bank + Time FE yes yes yes yes
IV no yes no yes
# obs 581 444 581 444
R2 0.832 0.838 0.832 0.829
p-val of Hansen stat 0.757 0.877
p-val of Underid. test 0.324 0.011
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 1.138 2.874
p-val of Godfrey test 0.668 0.148
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variable is bank
CDS spread at time t, defined as the monthly average of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAi,t+1) is the median
of the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. δEi,t is the standard deviation
of analysts’ forecasts formed on at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. 1(Pret) is an indicator function
identifying precise signals. 1(Pret) takes unitary value if the standard deviation of the forecasts on bank
i is below the median of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Imprt) identifies imprecise signals
defined as 1(Imprt) = 1 − 1(Pret). 1(Badt) is an indicator function identifying bad forecasts. 1(Badt)
takes unitary value if the forecasted ROA of bank i at time t is below the 25th (columns 1 and 2) or the
10th (columns 3 and 4) of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Goodt) identifies good forecasts and
is defined as 1(Goodt) = 1 − 1(Badt). Instrumented regressors in columns 2 and 4: 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1),
1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Badt)δEi,t and 1(Goodt)δEi,t . Set of instruments in columns 2 and 4: lags of
1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Badt)δEi,t and 1(Goodt)δEi,t and forecast errors lagged once or
more. Additional controls: , actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital
ratioi,t−1, net charge-offs to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1. Robust
standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.10.: Learning and Forecast Errors
Et(ROAi,t+1) δEi,t
(1) (2)
Crisis
Et−1(ROAi,t)
0.801***
[0.021]
FEt−1
0.0648** -0.0849***
[0.028] [0.027]
δEi,t−1
0.649***
[0.117]
FE2t−1
0.00344
[0.005]
Pre-crisis
Et−1(ROAi,t)
0.909***
[0.087]
FEt−1
0.275* -0.102***
[0.152] [0.029]
δEi,t−1
0.715***
[0.099]
FE2t−1
0.00823***
[0.003]
Bank + Time FE yes yes
# obs. 4551 3688
R2 0.83 0.72
Notes: within estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variable is the median of
the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1 (Et(ROAt+1) in column 1) or the
standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA of bank i in t+ 1 (δEt in column 2).
FE is the forecast error in previous forecasts defined as FEt = ROAt−Et−1ROAt. Coefficients are allowed to
vary in times of crisis (post September 2007). Additional controls: CDSi,t−1, actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1,
deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital ratioi,t−1, net charge-offs to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-
performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* indicate statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.11.: P
(
dP (def)
dβ > 0
)
λ
0.5 0.7 0.9 0.95
0.5 0 0.22 0.99 0.99
z 0.7 0 0.99 0.99 0.99
0.9 0 0.99 0.99 0.99
0.95 0 0.99 0.99 0.99
Table 1.12.: P
(
dP (def)
dα > 0
)
λ
0.5 0.7 0.9 0.95
0.5 0 0 0.05 0.06
z 0.7 0 0 0.29 0.31
0.9 0 0.31 0.69 0.69
0.95 0 0.55 0.77 0.77
Table 1.13.: P
(
d2P (def)
dξdβ < 0
)
λ
0.5 0.7 0.9 0.95
0.5 0.01 0.12 0.56 0.56
z 0.7 0.01 0.75 0.86 0.86
0.9 0.02 0.92 0.86 0.86
0.95 0.02 0.89 0.81 0.81
Table 1.14.: P
(
d2P (def)
dξdα < 0
)
λ
0.5 0.7 0.9 0.95
0.5 0 0 0.47 0.58
z 0.7 0 0 0.91 0.87
0.9 0 0.91 0.82 0.86
0.95 0 0.59 0.76 0.80
Table 1.15.: P
(
d2P (def)
dξdz < 0
)
λ
0.5 0.7 0.9 0.95
0.5 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.94
z 0.7 0.99 0.99 0.71 0.70
0.9 0.99 0.70 0.31 0.31
0.95 0.99 0.49 0.23 0.22
Table 1.16.: P(Default)
λ
0.5 0.7 0.9 0.95
0.5 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.18
z 0.7 0.01 0.04 0.37 0.38
0.9 0.01 0.38 0.62 0.62
0.95 0.01 0.51 0.67 0.68
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Table 1.17.: Robustness: the effect of expectations and precision
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Sep 2007 - Dec 2012.
Precise if δ < p(50) Precise if δ < p(33)
(1) (2)
1(Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -20.34* -28.49**
[11.64] [14.21]
1(Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) 0.772 0.621
[9.197] [9.150]
δEi,t 5.360 4.778
[8.436] [8.429]
CDSi,t−1 0.877*** 0.877***
[0.0461] [0.0461]
Bank FE yes yes
Quarter-region FE yes yes
IV yes yes
# obs. 1807 1807
R2 0.881 0.880
p-val of Hansen stat 0.385 0.346
p-val of Underid. test 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 24.46 15.49
p-val of Godfrey test 0.445 0.369
Tests (p-values)
1(Pret) = 1(Imprt) 0.009 0.012
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. We allow the time fixed effect to
be specific to the geographical region (North America, Eurozone, Asia, and rest of the world) of localization
of bank’s headquarter. The dependent variable is bank CDS spread at time t, defined as the monthly average
of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAi,t+1) is the median of the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA
of bank i in t + 1. δEi,t is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts formed on at time t on the ROA of
bank i in t + 1. 1(Pret) is an indicator function identifying precise signals. 1(Pret) takes unitary value if
the standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i is below the median (in column 1), or the 25th percentile
(in column 2), of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Imprt) identifies imprecise signals defined as
1(Imprt) = 1− 1(Pret). Instrumented regressors: 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t . Set
of instruments: lags of 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t and forecast errors lagged once or
more. Additional controls: , actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital
ratioi,t−1, net charge-offs to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1. Robust
standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.18.: Robustness: the direct effect of dispersion of beliefs
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Sep 2007 - Dec 2012.
Badt: Et(ROAi,t+1)< p(25) Badt: Et(ROAi,t+1)< p(10)
(1) (2)
1(Badt)δEi,t -91.30** -283.8**
[45.08] [144.7]
1(Goodt)δEi,t 4.117 -19.97
[9.784] [30.15]
1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1) -22.73** -15.07
[11.57] [16.91]
1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1) -4.984 3.652
[9.171] [14.39]
CDSi,t−1 0.922*** 0.906***
[0.0451] [0.0452]
Bank FE yes yes
Quarter-region FE yes yes
IV yes yes
# obs 1742 1734
R2 0.882 0.881
p-val of Hansen stat 0.707 0.748
p-val of Underid. test 0.000 0.033
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 12.58 13.97
p-val of Godfrey test 0.924 0.245
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. We allow the time fixed effect to
be specific to the geographical region (North America, Eurozone, Asia, and rest of the world) of localization
of bank’s headquarter. The dependent variable is bank CDS spread at time t, defined as the monthly average
of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAi,t+1) is the median of the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA
of bank i in t + 1. δEi,t is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts formed on at time t on the ROA of
bank i in t+ 1. 1(Pret) is an indicator function identifying precise signals. 1(Pret) takes unitary value if the
standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i is below the median of its cross-sectional distribution in time
t. 1(Imprt) identifies imprecise signals defined as 1(Imprt) = 1− 1(Pret). 1(Badt) is an indicator function
identifying bad forecasts. 1(Badt) takes unitary value if the forecasted ROA of bank i at time t is below
the 25th (column 1) or the 10th (column 2) of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Goodt) identifies
good forecasts and is defined as 1(Goodt) = 1 − 1(Badt). Instrumented regressors: 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1),
1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Badt)δEi,t and 1(Goodt)δEi,t . Set of instruments: lags of 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1),
1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Badt)δEi,t and 1(Goodt)δEi,t and forecast errors lagged once or more. Additional
controls: , actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital ratioi,t−1, net
charge-offs to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1. Robust standard errors
in brackets. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.19.: Robustness: the effect of expectations, precision and fragility
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Sep 2007 - Dec 2012.
Fragility
Leverage Customer dep. Interbank
(1) (2) (3)
1(Fragilet, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -34.06*** -41.55*** -28.33***
[10.46] [11.56] [9.454]
1(Fragilet, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -6.171 -7.600 -11.32*
[8.135] [7.938] [6.003]
1(Soundt, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -12.51* -13.32 -15.98**
[7.121] [8.166] [7.338]
1(Soundt, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -4.421 -0.980 -8.022
[6.572] [6.209] [6.274]
δEi,t -6.364 -7.937 -9.339
[6.629] [6.759] [6.043]
CDSi,t−1 0.926*** 0.922*** 0.934***
[0.0279] [0.0305] [0.0299]
Bank FE yes yes yes
Quarter-region FE yes yes yes
IV yes yes yes
# obs. 3016 3051 3012
R2 0.884 0.889 0.885
p-val of Hansen stat 0.343 0.906 0.813
p-val of Underid. test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 12.55 20.86 15.21
p-val of Godfrey test 0.406 0.634 0.302
Tests (p-values)
1(Fragilet, Pret) = 1(Fragilet, Imprt) 0.009 0.000 0.045
1(Fragilet, Pret) = 1(Soundt, Pret) 0.022 0.007 0.194
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. We allow the time fixed effect
to be specific to the fragility of the bank. The dependent variable is bank CDS spread at time t, defined as
the monthly average of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAt+1) is the median of the analysts’ forecasts formed at
time t on the ROA of bank i in t+ 1. δEt is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts formed on at time
t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. 1(Pret) is an indicator function identifying precise signals. 1(Pret) takes
unitary value if the standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i is below the median of its cross-sectional
distribution in time t. 1(Imprt) identifies imprecise signals defined as 1(Imprt) = 1 − 1(Pret). 1(Fragilet)
is an indicator function identifying fragile banks. 1(Fragilet) takes unitary value if banks’ measure of
structural solidity is below the median of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Soundt) identifies
sound banks and is defined as 1(Soundt) = 1−1(Fragilet). Fragility measures vary across columns: leverage
(total assets to common equity) in column 1, customer deposits to total funding ratio in column 2, and
net exposure towards other banks (loans to banks – deposits from banks) to total assets ratio in column
3. Instrumented regressors: 1(Fragilet)⊗1(Preciset)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t . Set of instruments: lags of
1(Fragilet)⊗1(Preciset)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t and forecast errors lagged once or more. Additional controls:
, actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital ratioi,t−1, net charge-offs
to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1 and the lag of the variable used in
the definition of fragility. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.20.: Robustness: the effect of expectations and precision
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Sep 2007 - Dec 2012.
Precise if δ < p(50) Precise if δ < p(33)
(1) (2)
1(Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -19.30** -38.45**
[9.153] [15.60]
1(Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -5.304 -4.899
[6.274] [6.186]
δEi,t -1.126 -3.228
[10.81] [10.89]
CDSi,t−1 0.933*** 0.915***
[0.0357] [0.0343]
Bank FE yes yes
Country-Month FE yes yes
IV yes yes
# obs. 2857 2857
R2 0.634 0.635
p-value of Hansen statistic 0.475 0.534
p-value of Underidentification test 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 22.86 9.36
p-val of Godfrey test 0.251 0.295
Tests (p-values)
1(Pret) = 1(Imprt) 0.033 0.016
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. We allow the time fixed effect to
be specific to the geographical region (North America, Eurozone, Asia, and rest of the world) of localization
of bank’s headquarter. The dependent variable is bank CDS spread at time t, defined as the monthly average
of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAi,t+1) is the median of the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA
of bank i in t + 1. δEi,t is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts formed on at time t on the ROA of
bank i in t + 1. 1(Pret) is an indicator function identifying precise signals. 1(Pret) takes unitary value if
the standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i is below the median (in column 1), or the 25th percentile
(in column 2), of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Imprt) identifies imprecise signals defined as
1(Imprt) = 1− 1(Pret). Instrumented regressors: 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t . Set
of instruments: lags of 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t and forecast errors lagged once or
more. Additional controls: , actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital
ratioi,t−1, net charge-offs to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1. Robust
standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.21.: Robustness: the direct effect of dispersion of beliefs
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Sep 2007 - Dec 2012.
Badt: Et(ROAi,t+1)< p(25) Badt: Et(ROAi,t+1)< p(10)
(1) (2)
1(Badt)δEi,t -44.49** -83.66*
[21.86] [43.43]
1(Goodt)δEi,t -8.869 -12.19
[7.448] [7.796]
1(Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -12.19* -12.84*
[7.098] [7.182]
1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1) 0.877 0.309
[4.125] [4.369]
CDSi,t−1 0.905*** 0.905***
[0.0300] [0.0304]
Bank FE yes yes
Country-Month FE yes yes
IV yes yes
# obs 2781 2772
R2 0.657 0.649
p-val of Hansen stat 0.520 0.467
p-val of Underid. test 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 15.57 15.23
p-val of Godfrey test 0.221 0.207
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. We allow the time fixed effect to
be specific to the geographical region (North America, Eurozone, Asia, and rest of the world) of localization
of bank’s headquarter. The dependent variable is bank CDS spread at time t, defined as the monthly average
of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAi,t+1) is the median of the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA
of bank i in t + 1. δEi,t is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts formed on at time t on the ROA of
bank i in t+ 1. 1(Pret) is an indicator function identifying precise signals. 1(Pret) takes unitary value if the
standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i is below the median of its cross-sectional distribution in time
t. 1(Imprt) identifies imprecise signals defined as 1(Imprt) = 1− 1(Pret). 1(Badt) is an indicator function
identifying bad forecasts. 1(Badt) takes unitary value if the forecasted ROA of bank i at time t is below
the 25th (column 1) or the 10th (column 2) of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Goodt) identifies
good forecasts and is defined as 1(Goodt) = 1 − 1(Badt). Instrumented regressors: 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1),
1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Badt)δEi,t and 1(Goodt)δEi,t . Set of instruments: lags of 1(Pret)Et(ROAt+1),
1(Imprt)Et(ROAt+1), 1(Badt)δEi,t and 1(Goodt)δEi,t and forecast errors lagged once or more. Additional
controls: , actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital ratioi,t−1, net
charge-offs to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1. Robust standard errors
in brackets. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.22.: Robustness: the effect of expectations, precision and fragility
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Sep 2007 - Dec 2012.
Fragility
Leverage Customer dep. Interbank
(1) (2) (3)
1(Fragilet, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -26.08** -26.74** -16.07*
[11.29] [10.89] [9.323]
1(Fragilet, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -2.675 -5.645 -2.738
[9.128] [6.704] [6.341]
1(Soundt, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -19.42** -12.59 -5.029
[9.262] [9.368] [8.899]
1(Soundt, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -8.228 -1.289 0.127
[6.380] [5.993] [5.882]
δEi,t 1.069 -2.007 -5.864
[9.341] [9.084] [8.910]
CDSi,t−1 0.905*** 0.917*** 0.897***
[0.0361] [0.0357] [0.0336]
Bank FE yes yes yes
Country-Month FE yes yes yes
IV yes yes yes
# obs. 2942 2942 2886
R2 0.676 0.670 0.679
p-val of Hansen stat 0.308 0.302 0.230
p-val of Underid. test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 22.49 24.26 15.98
p-val of Godfrey test 0.229 0.230 0.234
Tests (p-values)
1(Fragilet, Pret) = 1(Fragilet, Imprt) 0.019 0.021 0.039
1(Fragilet, Pret) = 1(Soundt, Pret) 0.528 0.171 0.231
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. We allow the time fixed effect
to be specific to the fragility of the bank. The dependent variable is bank CDS spread at time t, defined as
the monthly average of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAt+1) is the median of the analysts’ forecasts formed at
time t on the ROA of bank i in t+ 1. δEt is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts formed on at time
t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. 1(Pret) is an indicator function identifying precise signals. 1(Pret) takes
unitary value if the standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i is below the median of its cross-sectional
distribution in time t. 1(Imprt) identifies imprecise signals defined as 1(Imprt) = 1 − 1(Pret). 1(Fragilet)
is an indicator function identifying fragile banks. 1(Fragilet) takes unitary value if banks’ measure of
structural solidity is below the median of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Soundt) identifies
sound banks and is defined as 1(Soundt) = 1−1(Fragilet). Fragility measures vary across columns: leverage
(total assets to common equity) in column 1, customer deposits to total funding ratio in column 2, and
net exposure towards other banks (loans to banks – deposits from banks) to total assets ratio in column
3. Instrumented regressors: 1(Fragilet)⊗1(Preciset)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t . Set of instruments: lags of
1(Fragilet)⊗1(Preciset)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t and forecast errors lagged once or more. Additional controls:
, actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1 capital ratioi,t−1, net charge-offs
to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1 and the lag of the variable used in
the definition of fragility. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.23.: Robustness: the effect of expectations, precision and fragility
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Sep 2007 - Dec 2012.
Fragility
Leverage Customer dep. Interbank
(top 25%) (bottom 25%) (bottom 25%)
(1) (2) (3)
1(Fragilet, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -33.33* -33.64* -27.45**
[18.88] [17.89] [12.07]
1(Fragilet, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -1.980 -5.971 -8.616
[9.705] [17.23] [6.868]
1(Soundt, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -24.54*** -36.72*** -19.27**
[8.129] [12.70] [8.203]
1(Soundt, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -11.20* -19.60** -5.268
[6.564] [8.185] [7.026]
δEi,t -10.25 -11.74** -11.26*
[6.736] [5.718] [5.984]
CDSi,t−1 0.931*** 0.842*** 0.932***
[0.0305] [0.0782] [0.0303]
Bank + Time FE yes yes yes
IV yes yes yes
# obs. 3052 3017 3052
R2 0.880 0.875 0.880
p-val of Hansen stat 0.696 0.306 0.740
p-val of Underid. test 0.002 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 10.74 2.159 27.81
p-val of Godfrey test 0.313 0.212 0.350
Tests (p-values)
1(Fragilet, Pret) = 1(Fragilet, Imprt) 0.115 0.036 0.058
1(Fragilet, Pret) = 1(Soundt, Pret) 0.612 0.831 0.396
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variable is bank
CDS spread at time t, defined as the monthly average of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAt+1) is the median
of the analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. δEt is the standard deviation of
analysts’ forecasts formed on at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. 1(Pret) takes unitary value if the
standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i is below the median of its cross-sectional distribution in time t.
1(Imprt) is defined as 1(Imprt) = 1− 1(Pret). 1(Fragilet) is an indicator function identifying fragile banks.
Fragility measures vary across columns: leverage (total assets to common equity) in column 1, customer
deposits to total funding ratio in column 2, and net exposure towards other banks (loans to banks – deposits
from banks) to total assets ratio in column 3. Instrumented regressors: 1(Fragilet)⊗1(Preciset)Et(ROAt+1)
and δEi,t . Set of instruments: lags of 1(Fragilet)⊗1(Preciset)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t and forecast errors lagged
once or more. Additional controls: , actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1
capital ratioi,t−1, net charge-offs to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1 and
the lag of the variable used in the definition of fragility. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.24.: Robustness: the effect of expectations, precision and fragility
Dependent variable: CDS spread. Sample: Sep 2007 - Dec 2012.
Fragility
Leverage Customer dep. Interbank
(1) (2) (3)
1(Fragilet, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -42.93*** -50.61*** -43.91***
[12.64] [15.53] [15.51]
1(Fragilet, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -6.666 -20.45** -7.219
[8.693] [9.326] [6.747]
1(Soundt, Pret)Et(ROAi,t+1) -13.11 -31.01** -13.38
[9.143] [14.44] [9.104]
1(Soundt, Imprt)Et(ROAi,t+1) -6.184 -14.67** -3.775
[6.269] [7.477] [6.839]
δEi,t -11.13* -9.350* -10.80*
[6.021] [5.602] [5.981]
CDSi,t−1 0.930*** 0.843*** 0.930***
[0.030] [0.075] [0.030]
Bank + Time FE yes yes yes
IV yes yes yes
# obs. 3052 3017 3052
R2 0.881 0.875 0.881
p-val of Hansen stat 0.801 0.597 0.786
p-val of Underid. test 0.000 0.001 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 17.65 2.396 9.828
p-val of Godfrey test 0.347 0.152 0.353
Tests (p-values)
1(Fragilet, Pret) = 1(Fragilet, Imprt) 0.002 0.012 0.011
1(Fragilet, Pret) = 1(Soundt, Pret) 0.012 0.148 0.041
Notes: two-step GMM estimator with time and bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variable is bank
CDS spread at time t, defined as the monthly average of daily CDS spreads. Et(ROAt+1) is the median of the
analysts’ forecasts formed at time t on the ROA of bank i in t+ 1. δEt is the standard deviation of analysts’
forecasts formed on at time t on the ROA of bank i in t + 1. 1(Pret) is an indicator function identifying
precise signals. 1(Pret) takes unitary value if the standard deviation of the forecasts on bank i is below
the 25th percentile of its cross-sectional distribution in time t. 1(Imprt) identifies imprecise signals defined
as 1(Imprt) = 1 − 1(Pret). 1(Fragilet) is an indicator function identifying fragile banks. 1(Fragilet) takes
unitary value if banks’ measure of structural solidity is below the median of its cross-sectional distribution in
time t. 1(Soundt) identifies sound banks and is defined as 1(Soundt) = 1− 1(Fragilet). Fragility measures
vary across columns: leverage (total assets to common equity) in column 1, customer deposits to total
funding ratio in column 2, and net exposure towards other banks (loans to banks – deposits from banks) to
total assets ratio in column 3. Instrumented regressors: 1(Fragilet)⊗1(Preciset)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t . Set
of instruments in columns: lags of 1(Fragilet)⊗1(Preciset)Et(ROAt+1) and δEi,t and forecast errors lagged
once or more. Additional controls: , actual ROAi,t−1, leveragei,t−1, deposit to total funding ratioi,t−1, tier-1
capital ratioi,t−1, net charge-offs to gross loans ratioi,t−1, non-performing loans to gross loans ratioi,t−1 and
the lag of the variable used in the definition of fragility. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.25.: Banks in the Sample
Arab Emirates Wing Hang Bank Qatar National Bank
Abu Dhabi Comm Bank Hungary Russia
Dubai Islamic Bank OTP Bank Joint-Stock Investment Comm. Bank
Austria India MDM Bank
Erste Group Bank AXIS Bank Sberbank of Russia
Raiffeisen Bank Bank of India Saudi Arabia
Australia Canara Bank Riyad Bank
Adelaide Bank ICICI Bank Samba Financial Group
Australia and NZL Bank Indian Overseas Bank Saudi British Bank
Bank of Queensland Ireland Singapore
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Allied Irish Banks Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation
Commonwealth Bank of Austr. Bank of Ireland United Overseas Bank
Macquarie Bank Israel Spain
Macquarie Group Bank Hapoalim Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria
St. George Bank Italy Banco Espanol de Cre´dito
Suncorp-Metway Banca Generali Banco Pastor
Westpac Banking Corporation Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Banco Popular Espanol
Brazil Banca Popolare di Milano Banco de Sabadell
Banco Bradesco Banca Popolare di Verona Bankia
Banco Itau Capitalia Bankinter
Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros Intesa Sanpaolo Caja de Ahorros y Pensiones de Barc.
Canada Mediobanca Sweden
Bank of Montreal UniCredit Nordea Bank
Bank of Nova Scotia Unione di Banche Italiane Svenska Handelsbanken
Brookfield Office Prop. Canada Japan Swedbank
Can. Imperial Bank of Comm. Acom Switzerland
National Bank of Canada Aeon Financial Service UBS
Royal Bank of Canada Aiful Corporation Thailand
Toronto Dominion Bank Aozora Bank Bangkok Bank
Chile Bank of Fukuoka Kasikornbank
Banco Santander Bank of Kyoto Siam Commercial Bank
Banco de Chile Bank of Yokohama TMB Bank
China Chiba Bank Turkey
Bank of China Citigroup Global Markets JP Akbank
Cathay Financial Holdings Credit Saison Turkiye Garanti Bankasi
Cathay United Bank Daiwa Securities Group Turkiye is Bankasi
Chinatrust Commercial Bank Hiroshima Bank Ukraine
Chinatrust Financial Holding Joyo Bank Joint Stock Commercial Bank
E. Sun Financial Holding NIS Group USA
Fubon Financial Holding Nishi-Nippon City Bank AmSouth Bancorporation
Mega Financial Holding Nomura Holdings BB&T Corporation
Shin Kong Financial Holding Orix Corporation BNY Mellon, National Association
Sinopac Financial Holdings Sanyo Shinpan Finance Bank of America
Taishin Financial Holding Shinsei Bank Bank of New York Mellon
Denmark Shizuoka Bank Capital One Bank
Danske Bank Sumitomo Mitsui Fin. & Lease Capital One Financial Corporation
Jyske Bank Sumitomo Mitsui Fin. Gr. Charles Schwab
France Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank Citigroup
BNP Paribas Takefuji Corporation Discover Financial Services
Credit Agricole Corp. and Invest. Tokio Marine Financial Sol. Doral Financial Corporation
Credit Agricole Kazakhstan Fifth Third Bancorp
Natixis Bank CenterCredit Franklin Resources
Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale Kazkommertsbank Goldman Sachs Group
Germany OJSC Halyk Bank of Kaz. JP Morgan Chase & Co.
Commerzbank Malaysia KeyCorp
DePfa Deutsche Pfandbriefbank CIMB Bank Berhad Legg Mason
Deutsche Bank CIMB Inv. Bank Berhad Lehman Brothers Holdings
Deutsche Postbank EON Bank Berhad MBNA
UniCredit Bank Malayan Banking Berhad Marshall & Ilsley
Great Britain Netherlands Mellon Financial
Alliance & Leicester AEGON Bank Merrill Lynch & Co.
Barclays Ageas Finance Metlife
Bradford & Bingley Ageas Morgan Stanley
HBOS Royal Bank of Scotland NV PNC Financial Services Group
HSBC Holdings Norway Principal Financial Group
Invesco Holding Storebrand Bank ASA Prudential Financial
Lloyds Banking Group Philippines Regions Financial Corporation
Man Strategic Holdings Equitable PCI Bank SLM Corporation-Sallie Mae
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Rizal Commercial Banking State Street Corporation
Greece Portugal SunTrust Banks
Alpha Bank Banco BPI United Western Bancorp
Piraeus Bank Banco Espirito Santo Wachovia Corporation
Hong Kong Qatar Wells Fargo & Company
Bank of East Asia Commercial Bank of Qatar iStar Financial
Hang Seng Bank Doha Bank
56
1. The Role of Dispersed Information in Pricing Default: Evidence from the Great Recession
Figure 1.1.: Bad Expectations Figure 1.2.: Good Expectations
The blue line displays an agent’s expectation about the distribution of others’ beliefs about the profitability
of a bank when information is precise, whereas the green line shows that distribution when information is
imprecise. Note that the distributions are centers around the agent’s own expectation about the bank’s
profitability. Agents believing that a bank’s profitability level lies to the right of the red line roll over debt
to the bank whereas the opposite is true if profitability is expected to lie to the left of the red line.
Figure 1.3.: Monthly CDS spreads over time for banks operating in USA, Asia, and PIIGS.
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Figure 1.4.: Expected ROA over time for banks operating in USA, Asia, and PIIGS.
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Figure 1.5.: Dispersion of beliefs over time for banks operating in USA, Asia, and PIIGS.
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2. The Political Origin of Home Bias: the
Case of Europe
2.1. Introduction
The European sovereign debt crisis has emphasized the importance of banks’ exposure to
sovereign debt. Banks’ sovereign portfolios in Europe consist almost entirely of domestic
government debt. The average (median) own exposure, defined as the proportion of do-
mestic debt over the total sovereign portfolio, was 74% (86%) at the end of 2010. Figure
2.1 reveals that there is a significant degree of heterogeneity in banks’ holdings of domestic
debt within Europe: the median own exposure is in general higher in the periphery (PIIGS)
than in Northern Europe, with Germany (DE) being a notable exception. The level of do-
mestic exposures is well in excess of what standard finance theory would predict: there is
significant home bias (Figure 2.2) 1. In general, the home bias in sovereign bonds among
1The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) predicts that, in frictionless financial markets, homogenous
investors would hold a share of financial asset equal to the share of the financial assets of that country
in the world portfolio (see Cochrane (2005), page 155, and Coeurdacier and Rey (2012)). In the context
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European banks is quite persistent over time (Figure 2.3) and it tends to be higher in the
periphery than in Northern Europe 2. The sovereign exposures have important implications
for the real economy. During the sovereign debt crisis, banks incurred losses owing to the
decline in market value of the sovereign debt in their balance sheets and some recent papers
have shown that these potential losses are responsible for a sizable portion of the decline in
lending.3 Given that the riskiest bonds during the sovereign debt crisis were those issued
by the PIIGS, the large degree of home bias is especially troubling among PIIGS banks and
it may have exacerbated the recent recession.
In this paper, we investigate why European banks display a significant home bias in
sovereign bond holdings. We believe that certain banks hold a disproportionate amount
of their own country’s sovereign debt because they are controlled by domestic politicians.
In fact, many European banks have an explicit political participation through a block of
shares owned by either the regional state in which the bank is headquartered (Germany) or
the national government (Spain, Sweden, Portugal) or an indirect control exerted through
private foundations whose directors are appointed by local or national politicians (Italy).
These politicians may be interested in financing discretionary public spending to maximize
of sovereign bonds, we use the home bias measure as defined in Coeurdacier and Rey (2012):
HomeBias = 1− Share of Foreign Sovereigns in Bank i Sovereign Holding
Share of Foreign Sovereign Bonds in the Global Portfolio
When the home bias measure is equal to zero there is perfect diversification; when it is equal to one there
is perfect home bias. Anything in excess of zero indicates some level of home bias.
2Ireland is a noticeable exception, with an extremely volatile home bias. We believe this may be due to
the fact that these are raw data that do not take into account changing composition at the bank level
(mergers & acquisitions and bank failures).
3See Bofondi, Carpinelli and Sette (2013), Popov and Van Horen (2013) and De Marco (2013).
61
2. The Political Origin of Home Bias: the Case of Europe
their own objectives. These objectives may be increasing the chances of re–election or
diverting public funds to friends, relatives or controlled firms. They would then persuade
the politically controlled banks to finance national or local state borrowing by purchasing
government bonds 4.
We define our “political influence” variable as the total percentage of shares held by cen-
tral or local governments or by political foundations in the pre–crisis period (2006 or 2009).
The reason for using pre–crisis data is twofold: first we want to avoid biases given by bank
nationalizations that occurred in 2010–2011. In fact, during the crisis, many governments,
especially in Germany, Spain and the UK, were forced to intervene to recapitalize or bail–out
insolvent banks. Thus, if we were to measure “political influence” in 2011, we would largely
overestimate the state’s presence in the banking sector. Second, we claim that, although
clearly endogenous, public ownership of these banks is a historical, predetermined presence,
thus unlikely to be correlated with the error term in our main regression. The hypothesis
we take to the data is that a bank that has a historically strong political presence among its
shareholders will purchase more domestic sovereign bonds relative to a bank that does not
receive any political pressure. We find evidence for this hypothesis both before and during
the European sovereign debt crisis: a bank above the median political control has, ceteris
paribus, a home bias of 10 to 19 percentage points higher than a bank below the median.
Moreover, we exploit the fact that there have been plenty of equity injections by each
member State in the domestic banking system in both 2010 and 2011 to document the
4The European Banking Authority (EBA) data we use unfortunately do not distinguish between central
and local government debt. The sovereign exposure we refer to in this paper are the sum of the two.
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extent of political pressure/moral suasion on the controlled banks. We show that, during the
sovereign debt crisis and upon receiving government support, banks significantly increased
their exposure to domestic sovereign bonds only if they have strong political affiliations.
The effect is twice as large for “political” banks located in the periphery (+8.9%) than
for other “political” banks located elsewhere in Europe (+4.2%). These results are not
explained by other country–time factors such as higher sovereign yields in the periphery,
that would encourage purchase of sovereign bonds bonds from peripheral banks.
But government equity injections may be specifically targeted to political banks. If this
were the case, it would not be surprising that only political banks buy domestic bonds after
receiving government help. However, this does not appear to be the case: in 2010 and 2011,
equity injections were not directly targeted to banks that have larger political affiliations,
but rather to banks that performed worse in the previous year in terms of lower profitability
and a larger pool of non performing loans. In other words, although governments seem
to “twist arms” of politically controlled institutions into buying domestic debt, they also
provide financial aid to those that actually need it.
The political channel/moral suasion hypothesis is not the only explanation for the home
bias in sovereign bonds, both before and during the sovereign debt crisis. Standard infor-
mation asymmetries arguments, where the local investors are better informed about the
domestic sovereign than foreign investors, or other hedging motives may still be present.
More recently, several papers explain the increase in home bias in the PIIGS countries dur-
ing the sovereign debt crisis with creditor discrimination theories (Broner et al. (2014) and
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Brutti and Saure´ (2013)) or as arbitrage opportunities fueled by the ECB LTROs (Acharya
and Steffen (2013)). We do not challenge these hypotheses, we only show that politics also
plays a role.
There is yet another reason for banks to hold sovereign bonds, which is sometimes refer
to as capital arbitrage. Under Basel II, government bonds are considered almost risk free 5
so that banks would load their balance sheets with sovereigns to reduce risk–weighted assets
and increase capital ratios. We argue that while the regulatory framework has certainly
been a key factor in the excessive sovereign exposure among European banks, it cannot
explain home bias. In fact, the zero risk weight applies not only to domestic sovereign debt,
but to all countries in the European Union.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the related literature. In Section III,
we highlight some country-specific institutional details that are relevant to our analysis;
Section IV describes the data and the methodology used in the paper. Section V presents
the results and Section VI concludes.
5According to Basel II regulation, in order to compute Risk Weight Assets (RWA), banks can use two
approaches: the Standardized Approach and the Internal–Ratings Based (IRB) approach. According to
the first, government bonds receive a 0% risk weight as in Basel I. Under the IRB instead, the weight
should be strictly positive, because, even though the model may assign a very low probability of default
(PD) to a sovereign issuer, the loss given default (LGD) is positive. In practice, PD on sovereign debt are
equal 0.1% for 201 major international banks (BIS Quarterly Review, December 2013). Moreover, in the
European Union, there is a loophole that allows banks using the IRB to switch back to the Standardized
Approach when evaluating sovereign bonds “IRB permanent partial use”.
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2.2. Related Literature
The relationship between home bias in sovereign holdings and political influence at the bank
level, is, to the best of our knowledge, not been established in the literature.
First, we contribute to the enormous international finance literature pioneered by French
and Poterba (1991) that studies home bias in portfolio holdings. Most papers in this area
have documented home bias in equity rather than bond holdings. A few exceptions are
Bertaut, Tabova and Wong (2013), who show the decline in financial bonds’ home bias
among U.S. investors and Lane (2006), who shows that member countries of the European
Economic and Monetary Union disproportionately invest in one another and especially to-
wards their trade partners. Several recent papers analyze the increase in sovereign home
bias among banks during the recent sovereign debt crisis. Battistini, Pagano and Simonelli
(2014) document that only PIIGS banks respond to increases in country risk by increasing
their exposure to domestic sovereign bonds, while banks from core countries do not, suggest-
ing that redenomination/repatriation risk, i.e. the risk that the liabilities of banks would
be renominated in the local currency, is the driving force behind the increase in home bias.
Becker and Ivashina (2014) document a positive correlation at the country level between
domestic government holdings by national banks and aggregate measures of state ownership
in the banking system. Brutti and Saure´ (2013) analyze cross–country evidence in favor of
the secondary market theory suggested by Broner et al. (2014). According to this hypothe-
sis, in a crisis period, domestic banks would buy domestic debt in the expectation that the
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government will not default on domestic creditors. All these papers analyze country level
data, which ignores the cross–sectional heterogeneity at the bank level. Using a bank-level
panel, and constructing a measure of direct government ownership at the bank level, we
are able to dig deeper and provide an explanation for why some banking institutions hold
a disproportionately large amount of domestic sovereign bonds over total sovereigns.
Some theoretical papers also explore the home bias issue. Diamond and Rajan (2011)
advance the hypothesis that banks are keen to load up with illiquid assets because the
states of nature in which these assets default is the same in which the bank itself goes
bankrupt; in other words, banks rationally put all their risk in a state of the world that
would be catastrophic for them anyways (risk synchronization). Their argument has a
natural application if one considers sovereign bonds an illiquid asset. Acharya and Rajan
(2013) and Crosignani (2014) show that myopic governments have incentives to increase risk
synchronization. The evidence we find suggests that, upon receiving liquidity injections,
only the “political banks” boost their exposure to domestic government bonds relative to
foreign ones, thus synchronizing even more their default risk with that of their respective
domestic country.
Our findings also contribute to the literature on the perfomance of state-owned banks
and to the literature on related lending. Barth, Caprio Jr and Levine (2001) provide a
broad overview on the effects of regulation and ownership structure on the performance of
the banking system. In general, they find that greater state ownership of banks tends to be
associated with less developed banks and financial markets. Sapienza (2004) finds that firms
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located in areas where the party of affiliation of the bank’s chairman is stronger receive more
favorable loan conditions; Cun˜at and Garicano (2010) show that banks whose chairman held
a political position in the past perform worse than other banks. La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes
and Zamarripa (2003) find evidence that loans extended to related parties, either family
members or controlled firms, have on average lower rates, lower collateral requirements and
are more likely to default than unrelated ones.
2.3. Institutional Details
There are three European countries that stand out for the pervasive and systematic role of
politicians and local governments in the management of banks: Italy, Germany and Spain.
In what follows we provide some key features that distinguish each of these countries in
terms of political presence in the banking system. We also discuss the case of France as
an example of a banking sector without any direct political influence, at least in the last
decade.
Italy
Following the wave of liberalizations and privatizations that started at the European level
in the 1980s, the Bank of Italy and the government made an attempt to privatize the
numerous state-owned banks. In 1990, the Amato–Carli law transformed the state-owned
banks into private entities; these were controlled by Foundations (non–profit organizations),
that would have had to place their shares on the market at a later date to complete the
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privatization. In 1998, however, the Amato–Ciampi law superseded the 1992 law, reiterating
that Foundations are non-profit organizations, but adding that these should operate under
private law and not under public law as in the previous regime. As they became private
entities, they could no longer be forced to progressively sell off their shares on the market.
Thus, Foundations were able to maintain their controlling stakes in most Italian banks to
the present day.6 Importantly for our purposes, even though they became private, non-
profit entities, they are still under the influence of political groups. The members of the
board of directors in the Foundations are often appointed by local or national politicians.
Apart from one specific bank, MPS, the other four Italian banks in our dataset present
more than one Foundation among their shareholders. Moreover, most of the times, within
each Foundation there are members coming from both left and right wing parties. This
degree of heterogeneity should convey the idea that, in the majority of the cases, banks with
a large concentration of Foundations are influenced by a wide range of political parties.
Germany
The German banking system is organized in three different “pillars”: private banks, such as
Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank; cooperative banks, based on a member-structure where
each member has one vote and, finally, public banks.
The latter are financial institutions, typically owned by the regional states (Lander) or
by administrative districts or cities in which they are headquartered. Among these there
6Boeri (2012)http://www.lavoce.info/i-politici-ai-vertici-delle-fondazioni-bancarie/ (in Italian)
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are savings banks (Sparkassen) whose shareholders are usually local municipalities and the
regional banks (Landesbanken), that are mostly owned by their respective Lander through
a regional savings bank association.
Thus, in the case of Germany the definition of “political banks” is clear: those that have
a direct state participation among their shareholders. In the EBA dataset, the political
banks will mostly be the Landesbanken.
Spain
Savings banks represent a fundamental pillar of the Spanish banking system: founded in the
18th century with the objective of channeling private savings towards socially beneficially
investments, savings banks accounted for 40 percent of Spanish banks’ total assets in 2010.
They became financial institutions that do not distribute profits, that have no formal owner,
but several governing bodies representing two different classes of stakeholders: insiders and
outsiders.
Insiders are employees, depositors and private founders; outsiders are the regional govern-
ments and other public entities. The relative voting power of the two groups in each bank
depends on the specific regional law. Around a decade ago, in 2002, a national reform
capped the representation of public entities, including regional governments, at 50 percent
of the voting rights in each bank 7.
Since outsiders, i.e. the public entities, are focused on achieving socially oriented goals,
7In July 2010, the ceiling on voting rights of public entities was reduced to 40 percent and professional
expertise was required to sit in a governing bodies.
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improving profitability has not always been the main objective of savings banks. In this
regard, Illueca, Norden and Udell (2008) document that Savings banks were more likely to
open new branches and extend new loans in provinces that were politically close; addition-
ally, Cun˜at and Garicano (2010) provide some evidence that savings banks whose chairman
has political affiliations performed worse than other banks.
France
A different path has been followed by France.8 After World War II and up to the late
1980s, almost all banks, both investment and commercial, were either state-owned or co-
operatives. The Chirac government changed the situation when, in 1987, he privatized
several major banks, including Societe Generale and Paribas. Another wave followed few
years later in 1993, with the privatization of BNP among others. The complete privatization
of the banking system was accomplished in 2001.
2.3.1. Theory of Inter-Party Support
Whereas the political influence in the case of direct state ownership (Germany, Spain) is
clear, the case of foundations’ ownership (Italy) requires a more careful analysis: certain
banks are affiliated with only one political party that is not necessarily in power at any
given point in time. Monte Dei Paschi (MPS) in Italy is an example of such a bank: it is
affiliated with the centre–left municipal government and it has a strong home bias (96%)
even in 2010, when the national government is from centre–right. For these institutions, it
8Alain Plessis (2003), The history of banks in France, Federation Bancaire Francaise.
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is not clear why a political party that is not ruling the country would be interested in buying
sovereign bonds and finance public spending of their opponents. It may be interested in
doing quite the opposite in order to destabilize the incumbent government.
We claim that there are two main reasons that may explain that behavior. First of
all, local politicians can sustain a central government of the opposite political affiliation
in exchange for monetary transfers to the respective region or local municipality. There is
suggestive evidence, for the case of Italy, that regional transfers are not primarily dictated
by shared political affiliation; a more crucial determinant is the political strength of the
party in the specific region, regardless of political affiliation.9
Second, a theory that supports inter-party funding is borrowed from the political science
literature. Katz and Mair (1995) and Katz and Mair (2009) are the first to document
that political parties in a wide range of developed countries have started to behave like a
cartel. Instead of competing against each other on relevant issues, they transfer more and
more competences upward to technocratic and non-partisan commissions. Perhaps more
importantly, they decided to alter the structure of payoffs: they agreed on the introduction
of public financial subventions to political parties that are guaranteed regardless of whether
a party wins or loses. This last piece of regulation severely limits the incentives to compete in
order to win the elections, as the monetary payoffs are not linked to the election’s outcome.
Hence, the concern that a bank affiliated with a leftist party would have the incentive to
destabilize the governing right wing party is clearly downsized in light of the findings of
9Greco (2009) (mimeo).
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Katz and Mair.
2.4. Data and Methodology
Data
The dataset is the result of the merger of three different sources: detailed bank level data
on the exposure to sovereign bonds and liquidity injections from the EU–wide Stress Test
and Recapitalization Exercises; information on the pre–crisis degree of political presence
for each bank is collected from Annual Reports whenever available; other balance sheet data
comes from Bankscope.
The key dataset contains the information on political influence. Specifically, we want to
create a variable that captures the degree of government or politicians’ control within each
bank. We also want this measure to be dated prior to the sovereign debt crisis so as not to
bias the degree of political control with any bail out or nationalization policy that occurred
in 2010–2011. Hence we collect 2006 Annual Reports for all banks, except Spanish ones. It
is in fact difficult to find Annual Reports at earlier dates for some small Spanish Savings
banks, because many were recently acquired or merged with other banks. For this reason,
we resort to IMF data, which list for each savings bank the percentage of voting rights
held by local governments prior to 2009.10 We construct the variable Political as the sum
of any participation held by the local or central governments and by political foundations
in each bank; we then normalize it by its standard deviation. We sometimes find useful
10IMF (June 2012)
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to use a dummy variable, 1(Political), which takes value of one if the degree of political
control in a specific bank is above the median of the domestic country and zero otherwise.
We also create a dummy variable, 1(Cooperative), which takes value of one if the bank is a
cooperative and zero otherwise. It is important to distinguish between a non–cooperative
and cooperative bank, since the latter display certain features that are similar to those of
highly politicized banks even though they are not owned by the state (diffuse ownership
among cooperative members). Notably, cooperative banks display a high degree of home
bias in sovereign bonds, similar to political banks, probably due to the very “local” nature
of their business model.
Sovereign exposure data have been collected by the EBA in the context of the EU–wide
Stress Test and Recapitalization Exercises. Specifically in an effort to enhance transparency
and restore confidence in the financial system, the EBA decided to disclose bank-by-bank
result for both the 2010 and 2011 Stress Test Results and the so-called 2011 and 2012
Recapitalization Exercises. These exercises contain information on the capital composition,
including government aid in the form of equity support measures, credit risk exposure and
sovereign debt exposure to each of the 30 members of the European Economic Area (EEA
30) for all the participating banks. The sample consists of 90 European banks in March
2010, which we will refer to as end–of–year 2009, and December 2010; 61 banks in December
2011 and June 2012, covering at least 60% of banking assets in Europe and at least 50%
in each Member State. For December 2010 only, a breakdown of the credit portfolio by
categories of borrowers is available. For instance, we know the amount of credit granted
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to private corporations, public institutions, small and medium enterprises, the exposure to
residential mortgages and the amount of defaulted loans.
Finally, we match the EBA dataset with banks’ balance sheet data obtained from Bankscope.
Empirical Methodology
To measure the effect of political presence in a bank on its degree of home bias in sovereign
bonds, we run a set of cross-sectional regressions for 2009, 2010, 2011.11 For each year we
employ the following specification:
HomeBiasi = β1Politicali + γ′Xi + 1(Cooperativei) +Di + εi (2.1)
where HomeBiasi is one of two measures: i) the ratio of domestic bonds held by bank i
over the total European debt (OwnTS )
12 or ii) the home bias measure in Coeurdacier and
Rey (2012). The first measure is the most intuitive, but it ignores the nominal size of each
country’s stock of debt. For example, it is reasonable for Italian and German banks to
have a larger exposure to their home country’s debt than Belgian and Dutch banks because
Italian and German public debt are much larger. However, this does not pose a problem
in estimation because we control for country fixed effects that also absorb the size of a
country’s stock of debt. The second measure, on the other hand, explicitly takes this into
11The main variable of interest Politicali,j does not vary over time, so we cannot use panel regressions with
bank fixed effects.
12The EBA sovereign exposure data contains only countries belonging to the European Economic Area
(EEA30), a group of 30 countries which broadly coincides with the European Union. Only in December
2010 exposure to US and Japan was disclosed, but we drop these countries from our analysis as they are
only available for one year.
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account. It is defined as follows in Coeurdacier and Rey (2012):
HomeBias = 1− Share of Foreign Sovereigns in Bank b Sovereign Holding
Share of Foreign Sovereigns in the Global Portfolio
where Global is represented by the EEA30 countries in our data. This measure is bounded
between zero (perfect diversification) and one (perfect home bias), while anything in excess
of zero indicates some level of home bias.13 Comparing Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.2 reveals however
that the difference between the two measures is negligible: neither the country ranking nor
the level of home bias is very much affected. For example, Italian and German banks have
high positive values in both cases.
Politicali is also one of two measures. It is either the percentage of shares owned by the
domestic government or other domestic political entities (Foundations in Italy, for example)
divided by its standard deviation; or it is a dummy, 1(Politicali), equal to one if the bank
is above the median of the distribution of government ownership in each country.
Other explanatory variables we use are: Xi, a set of lagged bank balance sheet charac-
teristics (log of total assets, Tier1 ratio, Leverage, Deposits over Total Funding, ROAA,
Non Performing Loans over Gross Loans) and 1(Cooperativei) a dummy equal to one if
bank i is a cooperative bank. We allow for a different intercept in home bias for coopera-
tive banks because these banks are characterized by dispersed ownership among members
13Note that the first measure of home sovereign bonds over total sovereigns does not exactly replicate this:
it is also equal to one in case of perfect home bias, but it is equal to zero if the bank does not own any
domestic debt, not if the bank is perfectly diversified. This difference turns out not to matter in the
regression analysis.
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(one–head–one–vote) and no share directly owned by the domestic government: nonethe-
less, they usually exhibit a large home bias given by the very “local” nature of their business
model. It is also possible that others, more indirect forms of political influence are at play
in cooperative banks: it is often the case, in Italy for example, that cooperative firms have
strong ties with political parties. Finally, Di a country dummy identifying where the bank
is headquartered. Country dummies are important because they control for country spe-
cific factors; more specifically, they take into account i) institutional characteristics and ii)
optimal portfolio considerations.
The first motivation pertains to countries’ institutional heterogeneity; for example, we
need to control for the fact that in Spain the government participation in each bank, by
law, cannot exceed 50%, whereas in Germany the local government can hold any number
of shares. German Landers very often holds around 85% of shares in the Landesbanken.
Since we are interested in evaluating whether a certain political ownership is large or small
in a given country, a set of country–specific intercepts in the above regression is appropriate.
The second consideration has to do with asset pricing theory. The CAPM implies the fol-
lowing pricing equation: 1 = Et [Mj,t+1Ri,t+1] = Covt [Mj,t+1, Ri,t+1]+Et [Mj,t+1]Et [Ri,t+1].
Mj,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor or pricing kernel of country j at time t+1 and Ri,t+1
is the real rate of return on asset i at time t+ 1. The above equilibrium condition implies
that the optimal holding of any asset, sovereign bonds included, depends on the covari-
ance between a country specific factor and an asset specific component. Therefore, each
bank in country j should have the same exposure to the set of sovereign bonds. For this
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reason, the set of country dummies also reflects country specific portfolio aspects. We use
country dummies with both dependent variables, the home exposure over the total and the
Coeurdacier and Rey (2012) home bias measure.
In our second specification, we exploit the time dimension of the panel to investigate how
home bias varied during the crisis. We want to test the hypothesis that, upon receiving
an equity injection from the domestic government, only political banks increase their home
bias relative to other banks, especially if they are located in the periphery. This would be
consistent with a political pressure/moral suasion hypothesis, where the domestic govern-
ment calls on banks to buy sovereign debt at a time of low demand. Therefore, we run the
following panel regression:
∆HomeBiasi,t = β1GovHelpi,t−1 + β2
(
1(PIIGS)× 1(Politicali)
)
GovHelpi,t−1+
+ β3
(
1(NOPIIGS)× 1(Politicali)
)
GovHelpi,t−1 + γ′Xi,t−1 + ηi + λt + εi,t
(2.2)
where ∆HomeBiasi,t represents the change in home bias of bank i at time t, GovHelpi,t−1
is the amount of equity injection given by the domestic government to bank i at the begin-
ning of the year as a fraction of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA). 1(Politicali) is a non–time
varying dummy if bank i is above the median political control in each country and 1(PIIGS)
1(NOPIIGS) are dummies for whether bank i belongs to PIIGS or not. In this regression
we allow for the effect of equity injections to differ depending on whether a bank is politi-
cally influenced and at the same time whether or not it belongs to the PIIGS. Finally we
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control for bank fixed–effects, ηi, and for either year– or country–year fixed–effects λt.
Table 2.1 reports some summary statistics of the dataset. On average, the pre–crisis
(2006) ownership by domestic government or political entities in Europe is at 20% among the
90 banks participating in the European Stress Test in 2010. However, only 48 banks (53%
of the sample) have at least some level of political ownership and the dummy 1(Politicali)
shows that only 34% of the sample can be classified with an above the median political
control in each country. Home bias is high on average according to both measures, however
there is also a large heterogeneity, as it is evident from Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Also, 38% of
the banks in our sample received some form government help at the end of 2010, with an
average, conditional on the help being positive, of 3.6% of RWA. These are big numbers
considering that, on average, the Tier1 over RWA ratio is at 11% for all banks.
2.5. Results
Table 2.2 reports the results for the main set of cross-sectional regressions. In the first three
columns we regress the exposure to domestic sovereigns over total sovereigns in 2009, 2010
and 2011 on our continuous variable for political influence, Political, and a set of controls. In
the last three columns we repeat the exercise but now we use a dummy variable, 1(Political),
to capture political influence within each bank.
From the first two rows we notice that the coefficients of interest are always positive and
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significant at 5%.14 This implies that banks that are more politically influenced display
greater home bias in sovereign bond holdings. If we take a look at the first column, which
we can think of as a pre-sovereign debt crisis regression, we have that a one standard
deviation increase in the level of political influence (30 pct.points) is associated with an
increase in the domestic composition of the sovereign bond holdings by 8%, which is about
one third of a standard deviation of OwnTS .
On the other hand, by looking at the fourth column, the coefficient on the political dummy
implies that a bank that moves from the bottom 50% to the top 50% of the distribution of
political influence displays on average 12% more weight to domestic sovereigns relative to
the total, which is about half of a standard deviation of OwnTS .
A covariate that is always highly significant is bank size, as measured by the log of total
assets. The coefficient is a semi–elasticity and it implies that for a 1% increase in total
assets, the own exposure is expected to decline by 0.1 percentage points on average across
all the years. The punchline is that larger banks have a smaller home bias in sovereign
bonds: the sovereign portfolios of larger institutions are more diversified. Also cooperative
banks, on average and all else equal, have a own exposure 13 to 17 percentage points higher
than other banks, at least before 2011. Note that cooperative banks have no direct political
or state ownership, but the significant degree of home bias may be explained by the very
“local” nature of their business model. Or, possibly, it indicates that cooperative banks
may be subject to other forms of indirect political influence, that our measure of political
14Only in one out of six cases, the coefficient on 1(Politicali) is significant at 10%. Notice how it is significant
at 1% using the Politicali/std.dev measure in 2009 too.
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control cannot capture. It is often the case, at least in Italy, that cooperative savings bank
have strong political ties to political parties.
Next, in Table 2.3, we run the same regression but changing the dependent variable to the
Coeurdacier and Rey (2012) measure. The main results are basically unchanged, if anything
both the magnitude and the significance of the coefficients is larger in this specification.
2.5.1. Panel Regression: Political Pressures during the Sovereign Debt
Crisis
Now we ask whether politicians exerted pressures on controlled banks during the sovereign
debt crisis; more specifically, we want to test whether, upon receiving equity injections,
political banks increased their exposure to domestic sovereign bonds. We expect the effect
to be stronger for banks in the PIIGS, where the respective governments had an incentive
to encourage the purchase of government bonds so as to lower the yields.
Table 2.4 summarizes this heterogeneous impact of liquidity injections of banks’ portfolio
decisions. It displays the panel regression of changes in exposure to domestic relative to
total sovereigns. Government help here is defined as any form of equity injection, measured
as a fraction of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA), given by the respective governments. The
data come from the EBA Stress Tests and Recapitalization exercises, where either pur-
chase of ordinary bank shares by the government or government support measures count
as government help in the calculation of common equity of the bank. Column (1) suggests
that receiving government help by itself does not affect the bank’s choice between buying
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domestic or foreign sovereigns. However, a political bank that receives liquidity injections
by the local government would increase its exposure to domestic sovereigns. The effect is
larger if the bank is located in particularly distressed countries, namely the PIIGS. Column
(2) indicates that an additional equity injection of 1% of risk weighted assets is associated
with an increase in domestic relative to total sovereign exposure by almost 9%, compared
to 4% for non PIIGS banks. The two coefficients are sufficiently precisely estimated so that
a simple hypothesis test rejects the null that the two effects are the same at the 5% level.
The results would look very similar if we used the alternative definition of home bias in
Coeurdacier and Rey (2012).
These results suggest that sovereign countries, especially the PIIGS, use domestic political
banks to purchase the bonds they issue when there is a lack of demand. Indeed, upon
receiving freshly injected equity, only the politically controlled banks increase their degree
of home bias.
The panel regressions in Table 2.4 are not controlling for the fact that, during the crisis,
we may observe an increase in home bias because of country and time specific factors. In
particular, it is conceivable that PIIGS banks may have decided to increase their home bias
because of the very high yields in PIIGS sovereign bonds. Investing in these bonds was
risky, but for PIIGS banks it may be perfectly rational to put all risk in a state of the
world, a sovereign default, that corresponds to banks’ defaulting themselves (risk synchro-
nization). Also, these risky behaviors may have been funded by the ECB 3 year Long Term
Refinancing Operations (LTRO) in December 2011 and February 2012 that injected large
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amounts of liquidity, borrowed at 100 and 75 bps. respectively, into participating banks
(part of the carry trade hypothesis advanced by Acharya and Steffen (2013)). We test these
hypotheses and the robustness of our results in Table 2.5.
Columns (1)–(3) and (4)–(6) have the same set of controls, but the latter three split
the effect of the interaction between government help and political banks among PIIGS
and non–PIIGS banks. In particular, column (1) and (4) control for the change in the
sovereign yield and CDS in each period.15 We would expect the increase in the yield to
increase home bias, but the increase in CDS, a proxy for risk of default, should offset it.
The estimated coefficients are in fact positive and negative, respectively, but they turn out
to be non–significant. Column (2)–(3) and (5)–(6) use a set of country–time FE that absorb
all unobserved heterogeneity that is country and time specific, including yields and CDS.
Finally, column (3) and (6) include bank specific usage of LTRO funds divided by total
assets. Bank by bank figures on LTRO usage have not been released by the ECB, however
we have collected data from banks’ annual reports and industry reports for 47 major EBA
banks. These banks borrowed e514 bn. in both LTROs, around half of total gross funds.16
Figure 2.4 reveals that the LTRO have been dominated by Italian and Spanish banks (50% of
the LTRO 1+2 funds), although, admittedly, the disclosure for French and German banks
has been poor. In some cases we had to rely on industry estimates by Morgan Stanley
15The periods are: 2010Q4–2010Q1, 2011Q4–2010Q4, 2012Q2–2011Q4. The number of observations is
differentin column (1) and (3) because Bloomberg does not provide data for the sovereign yields and
CDS in all countries. We do not have information on Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg,
Malta, Poland and Slovenia.
16According to industry reports by Morgan Stanley Research (2012), only around half of gross funds were
actually new net funding, as banks rolled over existing ECB facilities into the LTRO. The data we have
collected are mostly on gross funds usage.
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Research (2012), because although it is known that a bank has participated, the actual
amount was not disclosed on annual reports. Since both 3 year LTRO operations took
place in December 2011 and February 2012, the LTRO variable takes a value of zero before
2012Q2 for all banks and then it is equal to the amount borrowed only for the 47 banks for
which information is available (it is missing in 2012Q2 for the other banks).
The results in all columns show that our hypothesis is robust even controlling for country–
time specific trends and the LTRO interventions: the coefficient on the interaction term
between government help and political banks is significant in all specifications. Moreover,
it appears that, after we take into account country–time characteristics, the political banks
in the PIIGS are the only ones that increase home bias after receiving government help. It
makes sense that the significance of the coefficient survives only for PIIGS banks, because
these are the countries whose governments have a higher incentive to pressure banks into
buying domestic government bonds during the crisis.
2.5.2. Determinants of Government Help: Not just for Political Banks
One could think that our previous set of results, the fact that political banks buy more do-
mestic government bonds during the crisis, could be explained by the fact that only political
banks received government help during the crisis. In that case it would not be surprising
that only political banks increase their respective own exposure to domestic governments.
In Table 2.6 we show that this is not the case. We estimate the relationship between the
amount of equity provided by local governments to each bank and a set of regressors, in-
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cluding past performance and political influence. The punchline is that equity injections are
targeting banks with low prior profitability and larger pools of non-performing loans, not
political banks directly. However, upon receiving these injections, only politically controlled
banks increase their holdings of domestic sovereigns.
The first two columns report OLS regressions while the last two use the Tobit estimator (we
report the slope coefficients in both cases). The last approach is more appropriate for this
scenario because we should think of government help as a censored variable. It is equal to
zero if the bank is in good shape and the government decides not to extend support or any
positive value otherwise. The right specification that takes in to account both the discrete
choice of whether or not to support a bank and the magnitude of the liquidity injection is
the Tobit model.
The qualitative outcome of the OLS and the Tobit regressions are the same: political influ-
ence has not played any additional role in attracting more support from the government.
The two main factors associated with greater government help are lower profitability (Re-
turn on Average Assets, ROAA) and more non-performing loans over gross loans (NPL/GL).
By looking at the marginal effects (not reported in the table) for 2010, we see that a de-
crease in lagged return on assets by 1% is associated with an increase in the probability of
receiving positive government support by 41% while an increase in non-performing loans
over gross loans by 1% is associated with an increase in the probability of receiving support
by 7.4%; all these effects are significant at 1%. The marginal effects are around two to three
times smaller for the 2011 case but still significant at 1%. These effects may seem large at
84
2. The Political Origin of Home Bias: the Case of Europe
first, especially that on profitability. However, it has to be kept in mind that a change in
ROAA of 1% is quite big, almost one standard deviation, while a change in non-performing
loans over gross loans by 1% is relatively small if compared to its standard deviation which
is 4%. For 2010, conditional on receiving support, a decrease in ROAA by 1% is associated
with an increase in liquidity injection over risk weighted assets by 1.5%, around one third
of its standard deviation; the effect of an increase of non-performing loans over gross loans
by 1% is an increase in liquidity injections over risk weighted assets by about one tenth of
its standard deviation.
2.5.3. Cross Validation: Allocation of Credit and Political Influence
Next, we ask whether politically influenced banks tend to facilitate their respective govern-
ments in more general terms, not only through purchasing more domestic sovereigns, but
also by extending more loans to domestic government institutions. To this purpose we take
advantage of the fact that, in 2010 only, the European Banking Authority released data on
each bank’ s allocation of credit broken down by country of destination and by type of loan;
for instance, we know the amount of credit that each bank issued to small and medium
enterprises (SME) and to government institutions broken down by the country in which the
borrower is located. We then call DomSME the share of domestic SME credit over total
SME credit and DomINST the share of loans to public institutions given to the domestic
government.
Table 2.7 indeed shows that the effect of political influence of banks’ behaviors is not spe-
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cific to the purchase of domestic sovereign, but it is valid in more general terms: politically
controlled banks extend more credit to domestic public entities than other banks do.
Contrary to our expectations, there is not strong evidence that political banks systemat-
ically extend more credit to small and medium enterprises; what seems to count to this
regard is bank size. This suggests that small banks may proxy for regional banks which
tend to lend more locally to small and medium enterprises.
2.6. Conclusions
We investigate why European banks suffer from a significant home bias in sovereign bond
holdings. We believe that certain banks hold a disproportionate amount of their own coun-
try’s sovereign debt because they are coerced by domestic politicians. In order to test this,
we analyze recently collected data from Stress Tests on European banks and we find ev-
idence supportive of this hypothesis: political banks hold more domestic sovereign bonds
and they increase their home bias in sovereign holdings conditional on receiving liquidity
injections by the respective local governments; this effect is more than twice as big for po-
litical banks belonging to the PIIGS than for other European banks. Interestingly, these
equity injections seem to be directed towards banks that need it rather than to political
banks in particular.
Moreover, we find that politically influenced banks tend to facilitate their respective gov-
ernments in more general terms, not only through purchasing more domestic sovereigns,
but also by extending more loans to domestic government institutions.
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Table 2.1.: Summary Statistics at December 2010
N Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Political ownership in 2006, (%) 90 21.3 31.3 0 100
1(Politicali) in 2006 90 0.34 0.47 0 1
Home Bias (Own/TotSov), (%) 90 74 26.4 9.8 100
Home Bias (CR(2012)), (%) 87 71.7 29 .05 100
Gov Help/RWA, (%) 90 1.4 3 0 21.85
1(GovHelp > 0) 90 .38 .46 0 1
Gov Help/RWA if > 0, (%) 35 3.6 4 .32 21.84
Tier1/RWA, (%) 90 11 3.7 4.3 34.7
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Table 2.2.: Home Bias (Own/TotalSovereign) and Political Presence.
HB2009 HB2010 HB2011 HB2009 HB2010 HB2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Politicali/std.dev. 7.747∗∗∗ 5.867∗∗∗ 5.717∗∗∗
(3.34) (2.71) (3.28)
1(Political)i 11.86∗ 10.19∗∗ 15.89∗∗∗
(1.95) (2.41) (4.11)
1(Cooperative) 18.11∗∗∗ 16.38∗∗ 10.16 18.51∗∗ 16.74∗∗ 12.42∗∗
(2.92) (2.67) (1.68) (2.54) (2.62) (2.20)
log(Asset)t−1 -7.241∗∗ -10.13∗∗∗ -14.47∗∗∗ -7.779∗∗∗ -10.24∗∗∗ -14.99∗∗∗
(-2.47) (-3.94) (-4.38) (-3.95) (-4.25) (-5.40)
Tier1t−1 1.426 -2.520∗∗ -0.902 1.014 -2.256∗ -0.973∗
(0.88) (-2.12) (-1.63) (0.64) (-1.85) (-1.89)
Leveraget−1 -0.350∗∗∗ 0.0892 -0.248 -0.398∗∗∗ 0.0495 -0.224
(-3.26) (0.69) (-1.61) (-3.51) (0.39) (-1.55)
(Dep/TF)t−1 -0.513∗∗ 0.134 0.0195 -0.556∗∗ 0.141 0.0213
(-2.14) (0.62) (0.05) (-2.06) (0.60) (0.05)
ROAAt−1 -0.113 5.995 -0.0235 -0.0733 4.018 -1.633
(-0.03) (1.18) (-0.01) (-0.02) (0.84) (-0.52)
(NPL/GL)t−1 3.540∗∗ -0.816 -1.139 4.091∗∗ -0.613 -1.054
(2.35) (-0.68) (-1.64) (2.34) (-0.54) (-1.66)
N 71 77 57 71 77 57
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: set of cross–sectional regressions of banks in 2009, 2010, 2011. The dependent variable is the ratio
of domestic sovereign over total sovereign. Politicali/std.dev is the ratio of political ownership over its
standard deviation; 1(Political)i is a dummy equal to one if the bank is above the median of the distribution
of political ownership in each country; 1(Cooperativei) is a dummy equal to one if bank i is a cooperative;
log(Assetst−1), T ier1t−1, Leveraget−1, (Dep/TF )t−1, ROAAt−1, (NPL/GL)t−1 are, respectively, the
log of total assets, the Tier1 ratio over RWA, the ratio of total assets and common equity, the deposits to
total funding ratio, the average return on assets and the ratio of non–performing loans over total loans, all
lagged by one year. Std.err. are White HAC robust.
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Table 2.3.: Home Bias (Coeurdacier and Rey (2012)) and Political Presence
HB2009 HB2010 HB2011 HB2009 HB2010 HB2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Politicali 10.09∗∗∗ 7.527∗∗∗ 7.220∗∗∗
(3.81) (3.01) (4.05)
1(Political)i 15.71∗∗ 12.45∗∗ 18.81∗∗∗
(2.27) (2.67) (4.59)
N 69 75 58 69 75 58
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other: Log(TA)(-)***, Coop(+)***, Tier1(-), Lev(-), NPL(-), Dep(-) and ROAA(+)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: set of cross–sectional regressions of banks in 2009, 2010, 2011. The dependent variable is the
Coeurdacier and Rey (2012) measure:
HomeBias = 1− Share of Foreign Sovereigns in Bank b Sovereign Holding
Share of Foreign Sovereign Bonds in the Global Portfolio
Other bank controls defined as before.
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Table 2.4.: Political Pressure on the Banks. Panel regression.
(1) (2)
∆HomeBiasi,t ∆HomeBiasi,t
Gov Helpt−1 -.746 -0.739
(-1.13) (-1.12)
1(Political)×GovHelpi,t−1 7.877∗∗∗
(5.51)
1(Political, P iigs)×GovHelpi,t−1 8.981∗∗∗
(8.15)
1(Political,NoPiigs)×GovHelpi,t−1 4.192∗∗
(2.08)
N × T 187 187
N of banks 77 77
Bank + Year FE yes yes
Other Bank Controls: Tier1(-)***,Log(TA)(-)*,Lev(-),NPL(-),Dep(-)
P-Value of the Test
1(Pol,Piigs)Gov = 1(Pol,NoPiigs)Gov 0.0337
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Panel regressions. The dependent variable is ∆HomeBiasi,t defined as the change in the
ratio of domestic sovereign bonds over total sovereigns between 2010Q4–2010Q1, 2011Q4–
2010Q4, 2012Q2–2011Q4. GovHelpi,t−1 is the government equity injection as a percentage
of RWA given to bank i at the beginning of the period. Other variables are defined as before.
Std.err. are clustered at the bank–year level.
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Table 2.5.: Political Pressure on the Banks: Robustness
Yields Country– LTRO Yields Country– LTRO
and CDS time FE and CDS time FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Y ield 220.3 295.8
(0.77) (0.98)
∆CDS5Y -254.9 -408.9
(-1.15) (-1.49)
LTRO/TotalAssets -2.877 -3.360
(-0.81) (-0.93)
Gov Helpi,t−1 -1.149 0.369 0.489 -0.719 0.685 0.179
(-1.62) (0.48) (0.66) (-0.89) (0.87) (0.30)
1(Political)× 5.050∗ 10.94∗∗ 12.17∗∗
Gov Helpi,t−1 (1.85) (2.05) (2.47)
1(Political, Piigs)× 7.343∗∗∗ 16.53∗∗ 16.53∗∗
Gov Helpt−1 (2.26) (2.42) (2.08)
1(Political, NoPiigs)× 4.096 4.814 11.15∗
Gov Helpi,t−1 (0.72) (1.36) (1.67)
N 155 187 176 155 187 176
N bank 66 77 76 66 77 76
Bank + Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country–time FE no yes yes no yes yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Panel regressions. The dependent variable is ∆HomeBiasi,t defined as the change in the ratio of do-
mestic sovereign bonds over total sovereigns between 2010Q4–2010Q1, 2011Q4–2010Q4, 2012Q2–2011Q4.
GovHelpi,t−1 is the government equity injection as a percentage of RWA given to bank i at the beginning
of the period. ∆Y ield, ∆CDS5Y are the growth rates of sovereign yields for 10 year bonds and 5 years
CDS rates over the relevant periods. LTRO/TotalAssets is the borrowing from the 3–year LTRO oper-
ation in December 2011 and February 2012 at the bank level (47 banks) over total assets. It is equal to
zero for all banks before 2012Q2 and equal to the LTRO amount for the 47 banks for which information
on the borrowed amount was found and missing otherwise. Other variables are defined as before. Std.err.
are clustered at the bank–year level.
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Table 2.6.: Determinants of Government Help
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
Gov Help2010 Gov Help2011 Gov Help2010 Gov Help2011
1(Political)i -0.572 -0.560 -0.462 -0.000265
(-0.86) (-0.62) (-0.37) (-0.00)
ROAAt−1 -1.880∗∗∗ -1.361∗∗∗ -5.222∗∗∗ -1.928∗∗∗
(-3.16) (-6.81) (-4.96) (-3.95)
(NPL/GL)t−1 0.300∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗
(2.60) (2.01) (2.90) (2.84)
1(Cooperative) -2.360∗∗∗ -1.100 -6.226∗∗ -2.210
(-2.71) (-1.58) (-2.46) (-0.88)
1(PIIGS) 0.172 1.488 -0.0145 0.653
(0.37) (1.56) (-0.01) (0.30)
log(Asset)t−1 0.114 -0.160 0.753∗ -0.316
(0.56) (-0.63) (1.73) (-0.47)
Tier1t−1 0.164 0.463∗∗∗ 0.202 0.683∗∗∗
(1.11) (5.27) (0.57) (4.77)
(Dep/TF)t−1 -0.0401 -0.0248 -0.0288 -0.0130
(-0.82) (-0.74) (-0.42) (-0.16)
N 77 57 77 57
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7.: Allocation of Credit and Political Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DomSME2010 DomINST2010 DomSME2010 DomINST2010
Politicali/std.dev. 4.874∗ 5.751∗∗
(1.87) (2.06)
1(Political)i 8.687 17.17∗∗
(1.60) (2.15)
1(Cooperative) 0.483 3.552 0.361 5.232
(0.04) (0.37) (0.03) (0.54)
log(Asset)t−1 -5.646∗∗∗ -7.592∗∗∗ -5.813∗∗∗ -7.346∗∗∗
(-2.90) (-3.49) (-2.95) (-3.46)
(Dep/TF)t−1 -0.425∗∗ -0.363∗ -0.392∗ -0.332∗
(-2.10) (-1.86) (-1.86) (-1.72)
Tier1t−1 0.432 -0.297 0.294 -0.482
(0.39) (-0.18) (0.27) (-0.29)
N 70 79 70 79
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2.1.: Median Sovereign Home Bias by country, December 2010
Source: EBA Stress Test 2011. Home Bias defined as the ratio of domestic sovereign by bank b over the
total: HomeBias = Ownb/TotalSovereignb. Country codes are the following: Belgium (BE), France
(FR), Netherlands (NL), Great Britain (GB), Sweden (SE), Austria (AT), Finland (FI), Ireland (IE),
Denmark (DK), Slovenia (SI), Portugal (PT), Germany (DE), Italy (IT), Greece (GR), Spain (ES).
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Figure 2.2.: Median Sovereign Home Bias by country, December 2010
Source: EBA Stress Test 2011. Home bias measure as defined in Coeurdacier and Rey (2012):
HomeBias = 1− Share of Foreign Sovereigns in Bank b Sovereign Holding
Share of Foreign Sovereign Bonds in the Global Portfolio
The Global portfolio in our case is the EEA30 portfolio, as we have sovereign exposure data for these
countries only. When the home bias measure is equal to zero there is perfect diversification; when it is
equal to one there is perfect home bias. Anything in excess of zero indicates some level of home bias.
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Figure 2.3.: Aggregate Sovereign Home Bias by country, Sept 1997 – Sept 2014
Source: ECB Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) aggregate statistics: ratio between Home and Total
of “Securities other than shares” on the Government portfolio (MFI assets). These statistics are given at
the country level for all financial institutions (excl. European Central Banks) with a changing composition
(i.e. this is the raw data that does not take into account mergers&acquisitions and bank failures).
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Figure 2.4.: LTRO(1+2) 3 year
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3. Consumption Volatility and Borrowing
Constraints in Small Open Economies
3.1. Introduction
The business cycle of emerging markets is quite different from that of developed economies,
the most striking difference being that consumption is more volatile than output in emerg-
ing economies whereas the opposite is true in developed countries. We rationalize this
phenomenon by introducing borrowing constraints in an otherwise standard small open
economy model; the purpose is to characterize an economy that is borrowing from abroad
but does not have access to a full set of state contingent contracts. Domestic agents are only
able to borrow up to a certain fraction of the expected next-period value of their collateral
as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). With the value of collateral being procyclical, agents
are able to consume more than what they produce after a positive TFP shock, making
consumption more volatile than output. The main model’s implication is that a better abil-
ity to borrow, namely a larger loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, leads to a greater consumption
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volatility relative to output.
When we bring this model’s implication to the data, we use indices of financial development
and lending regulation to proxy for the loan-to-value ratio; we do so because the theory
of corporate finance establishes a link between the two:1 in the simplest model of credit
allocation under limited enforcement, an agent can choose between running a project that
has a high probability of success and another one that yields some private benefits and
has a smaller probability of success. One outcome of this agency problem is that a greater
ability to extract private benefits is associated with a reduced capability to pledge income
which translates into a lower LTV ratio.
We then proceed to empirically test the relationship between various indices of financial de-
velopment and relative consumption volatility, finding that the model’s implication is sup-
ported by the data: in emerging countries, deeper capital markets and more lending-friendly
regulation lead to greater volatility of consumption relative to output; on the contrary, in
developed economies, these indicators of financial and regulatory development are either
exerting no effect or actually stabilizing consumption relative to output. This empirical
dichotomy between emerging and developed countries is in line with our modeling choice of
characterizing an emerging country that is subject to borrowing constraints.
Another dichotomy emerges between the two indices of financial development we use: on
the one side, deeper capital markets increase the relative consumption volatility in emerging
countries but not in developed ones; on the other hand, more credit channeled by banks
1See Tirole (2010).
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reduces the relative consumption volatility in developed countries while it has no effect in
emerging economies.
In a standard open economy model with stationary TFP processes, the complete market
allocation involves consumption being less volatile than output.2 Usually financial glob-
alization and financial development are believed to bring countries closer to the complete
market benchmark which allows to achieve high levels of consumption risk sharing and low
levels of relative consumption volatility. However, this paper shows both theoretically and
empirically that financial development may actually lead to the opposite and unwanted re-
sult. From the model’s point of view, more financial development translates into a greater
ability to borrow against collateral which leads to more procyclical net debt (more coun-
tercyclical net exports) and thus more volatility in consumption relative to output.
Moreover, our findings suggest that the destabilizing effect of financial development is only
at work among emerging economies whereas developed countries are not harmed by it. In
addition, it also appears that, among emerging countries, it is more desirable to develop the
domestic banking sector instead of the domestic equity market because the development of
the latter significantly increases relative consumption volatility while the former does not.
A vast body of theoretical models have been proposed to rationalize this consumption
volatility pattern of emerging markets: Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) rely on trend growth
shocks which ultimately make permanent income more volatile than transitory income;
2In practice, consumption risk sharing is achieved through procyclical net exports: when the domestic
economy is hit by a negative TFP shock it borrows from abroad in order to smooth consumption; this
requires the domestic economy to import more goods from abroad by accumulating liabilities.
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Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Arellano (2008), although with different modeling strate-
gies, deliver the above result through countercyclical interest rates. More similar to our
analysis is Mendoza (2010): motivated by explaining some key facts about sudden stops,
he generates high consumption volatility by interacting disturbances in interest rate, price
of imported intermediate goods and TFP which get amplified by a collateral constraint.3
Even though our model shares some features that characterize sudden stops, our model is
geared towards capturing standard business cycles frequency events instead of sudden stops
and surges, which are considered tail events.4
A lot of attention has been devoted to the links between financial development and growth,5
but relatively less emphasis has been directed towards the link between financial develop-
ment and consumption volatility. On the theoretical side, Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee
(2004) show that the relationship between financial development and stability is not mono-
tonic. Levchenko (2005) stresses that financial liberalization greatly benefit agents with
direct access to international financial markets while it can generate higher consumption
volatility for agents without access while Leblebiciog˘lu (2009) points out that financial inte-
gration may induce consumption to react more to TFP shocks than under autarky. Other
papers, such as Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Heathcote and Perri (2002), also study how
different degrees of financial integration affect international risk sharing and the transmis-
sion of business cycles.
3See also Akinci and Chahrour (2014) for a model that displays sudden stops and leverage cycles with
borrowing constraints and news shocks.
4See Forbes and Warnock (2012) for a detailed empirical analysis of sudden stops and surges.
5See for instance Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), King and Levine (1993), Levine, Loayza and
Beck (2000) and Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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On the empirical side, there is a number of papers that analyze the link between finan-
cial development and macroeconomic volatility. Loayza and Ranciere (2005) and Ranciere,
Tornell and Westermann (2006) provide evidence on the contrasting effects of financial de-
velopment which can bring both higher short-run volatility and greater long-run growth.
Closer in spirit to our research question, Fulford (2011), Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003),
Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2007) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006) study the im-
pact of financial development and financial liberalization on consumption volatility. Fulford
(2011) shows how access to credit creates consumption booms in the short run, followed
by lower consumption in the long run. Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) document that,
especially among emerging markets, financial openness is associated with an increase in rel-
ative consumption volatility, which is in contrast with the notion that financial integration
improves consumption risk sharing. Similarly, Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2007) highlight
that financial globalization has opposite effects on industrial and emerging economies: it
improves risk sharing among industrial countries whereas it reduces risk sharing among
emerging markets. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006) restrict the effect of financial
liberalization to be homogeneous across industrial and emerging economies and obtain that
financial liberalization is associated with lower relative consumption volatility.
Finally, our work shares similar results with Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) and Cesa-
Bianchi, Cespedes and Rebucci (2015) which study the link between international capital
flows, house prices appreciation and financial conditions: Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009)
find that in non-OECD countries there is a strong positive association between current
102
3. Consumption Volatility and Borrowing Constraints in Small Open Economies
account deficits and real estate appreciation, the more so the greater financial depth is in
the specific country; Cesa-Bianchi, Cespedes and Rebucci (2015) document that exogenous
changes in global liquidity have a much stronger impact on house prices and consumption
in emerging markets than in advanced economies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II introduces the model; Section III presents the
model’s impulse responses and testable implications while Section IV describes the empirical
methodology and the data. Section V shows the empirical results and Section VI concludes.
3.2. Model
Households. The representative household has GHH utility, u(Ct, ht) =
[Ct−Ψthνt ]1−σ
1−σ ,
where C is consumption, h is hours worked.6 Each household has Kt units of capital,
which he can sell at price qt or rent out to firms which will correspond dt units of final
good as dividends for each unit of borrowed capital. Moreover, each household can borrow
internationally at the world interest rate, 1 + r; however, the amount of borrowing cannot
exceed a fraction χ of the expected next-period value of capital owned; χ is usually refereed
to as the loan-to-value ratio. Capital here plays a dual role: it is both a factor of production
and collateral against which to borrow; moreover, it depreciates at rate δ and each household
can decide to invest the amount It in new capital, where It = Kt+1− (1− δ)Kt; this process
of capital creation however depletes some real resources, the more so the faster the rate of
6In Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988), Ψt is a constant term while here Ψt = ΨXt, where Xt is
the deterministic trend component the economy; this modification has to be introduced to make hours
worked stationary.
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capital creation is. In the spirit of Abel and Blanchard (1983), the cost of adjusting capital
is convex in investment: Φ(Kt+1,Kt) ≡ φ2
(
Kt+1
γKt
− 1
)2
Kt .
The flow budget constraint, the law of motion of capital and the borrowing constraint for
the representative household take the form
(1 + r)Bt + Ct + +It + Φ(Kt+1,Kt) ≤Wtht + dtKt +Bt+1 ; λt
Kt+1 ≤ It + (1− δ)Kt ; qtλt
Bt+1 ≤ χEt[qt+1Kt+1] ; µt
Firms. The representative firm produces final good Yt by employing labor and capital
according to the labor-augmenting production function Yt = zt(Xtht)α(Kt)1−α , where zt
is a stationary productivity shock and Xt is a deterministic trend component that evolves
according to the process Xt+1 = γXt, where γ > 1.
Transformed Model. It is useful to transform upper case variables into stationary vari-
ables expressed in units of effective labor. Thus, lower case variables, such as ct, bt, wt, qt,
dt, yt, kt, it, are expressed in units of effective labor; for instance, ct = Ct/Xt.
As a result, the period utility of the representative household becomes u(Ct, ht) =
X1−σt [ct−Ψhνt ]1−σ
1−σ
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while budget constraint, law of motion of capital and borrowing constraint are rewritten as
(1 + r)bt + ct + it +
φ
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt ≤ wtht + dtkt + γbt+1 ; λt
γkt+1 ≤ it + (1− δ)kt ; λtqt
bt+1 ≤ χEt[qt+1kt+1] ; µt
and finally the production function becomes yt = zthαt k
1−α
t .
The representative household chooses sequences of consumption, labor, capital, investment
and debt to maximize expected lifetime utility subject to the above set of constraints. The
lagrangean associated to this problem is
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtX1−σt
{(ct −Ψhνt )1−σ
1− σ + λt[wtht + dtkt + γbt+1 − (1 + r)bt − ct − it+
− φ
2
(
it − (δ + γ − 1)kt
γkt
)2
kt+
+ qt(it + (1− δ)kt − γkt+1)]+
+ µt[χqt+1kt+1 − γbt+1]
}
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and the first order conditions with respect to ct, ht, it, kt+1 and bt+1 are
[ct −Ψhνt ]−σ = λt
[ct −Ψhνt ]−σ Ψνhν−1t = wtλt
qt = 1 +
φ
γ
(
it − (δ + γ − 1)kt
γkt
)
γλtqt = Et
{
β˜λt+1
[
dt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1 + φ2γ2
(( it+1
kt+1
)2 − (δ + γ − 1)2)]+ χµtqt+1}
γλt = µt(1 + r) + β˜(1 + r)Etλt+1
where we define β˜ ≡ βγ1−σ and we do not specify the extra Kuhn-Tucker conditions as we
assume that the credit constraint is binding in the steady state and in a small neighborhood
of it. The second to last equation is the Capital Euler Equation, which states that the
marginal cost (in terms of lower consumption today) of postponing consumption in the
future is equal to the marginal benefit of investment: by investing one unit of capital, in
the next period agents gain the real interest rate, they face a lower adjustment cost of
capital and they relax the borrowing constraint as the value of collateral increases. The
representative firm maximizes profits taking prices as given and so it ends up paying factors
their marginal products: wt = αyt/ht and dt = (1− α)yt/kt.
The steady state equations and the log-linear approximation of the model’s dynamics are
displayed in Appendix B.1 and B.2 respectively. Few facts about the steady state ought to
be underlined. First, since the pioneering work of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) it was clear
that simple open economy models could not pin down a steady state level of net foreign
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assets; thus, in order to study dynamic responses, one has to assume an initial value for
net foreign assets. However, any temporary shock would lead to a new steady state. Our
model does not suffer from this problem as the borrowing constraint pins down a unique
steady state level of net foreign assets and any stationary shock will induce stationary
dynamic responses. The use of always binding borrowing constraints thus adds to the list
of stationarity-inducing devices studied in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003).
Second, given λ > 0, the credit constraint multiplier µ = λ( γ1+r − β˜) is positive if and only if
γσ > β(1 + r), which does not necessarily require the country to grow faster than the world
interest rate; the more impatient or risk averse agents are, the lower is the lower bound on
the growth rate.
Finally, as shown in Appendix B.1, the steady state level of capital is decreasing in χ :
a better ability to borrow (larger χ) increases the collateral value of capital, captured by
χµλ , as agents can borrow more against the same level of capital. Therefore agents need to
accumulate less collateral in order to frontload consumption.
3.2.1. Calibration
We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency; we set the world interest rate to 3%, the
capital depreciation rate to 8%, and Ψ = 1. Each of the remaining seven parameters is
allowed to vary on a grid:
γ ∈ [1, 1.05], α ∈ [0.4, 0.6], β ∈ [0.85, 0.995], εhw ∈ [0.2, 4], σ ∈ [1, 5], χ ∈ [0.01, 0.99] and
φ ∈ [0.02, 4], where εhw is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply which equals to 1ν−1 .
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We discard the calibrations that do not satisfy the steady state restrictions on both mul-
tipliers; more specifically, in order for the economy to be constrained in the transitional
dynamics, we need it to be constrained at the steady state as well, since we are solving the
model linearly around the steady state. Thus, we require the borrowing constraint multi-
plier to be positive in steady state, µ =
(
γ
1+r − β˜
)
λ > 0, and we also make sure that the
marginal utility of consumption is positive, λ > 0.
For each calibration that satisfies these restrictions, we simulate the model and we collect
the second moments that we want to match; these are the same moments targeted by
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). Table 3.1 shows both the moments estimated by Aguiar
and Gopinath (2007) and our estimates based on a sample of 100 countries instead of 13,
using annual data.7 Finally, we pick the calibration that minimizes the Loss Function
L =
∑
i ωi
(
m˜i−m∗i
m∗i
)2
, where m∗i is our estimate of the i− th moment, m˜i is the simulated
one and ωi is a weight; the choice to minimize a sum of squared percentage deviations instead
of squared deviations is motivated by the following fact: the moments that we target are
both correlations that lie in the [−1, 1] interval and ratios of standard deviations that range
from zero to +∞, so that a reasonable measure of distance that does not favor reaching
one target instead of another has to scale the moments to make them comparable. For
instance, if we were to minimize the sum of squared deviations, we would end up picking
a calibration that targets more closely ratios of standard deviations instead of correlations;
indeed, the largest squared deviation admissible for a correlation is (−1− 1)2 = 4 while the
7The countries we consider here are the bottom 75% by trend component of the log of real gdp averaged
from the beginning of the sample to 1990.
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largest squared deviation admissible for a ratio of standard deviations is infinite. On the
contrary, minimizing a sum of squared percentage deviations attenuates this problem.
If we weigh each squared percentage deviation equally, we obtain the following calibration,
which we will refer to as the baseline calibration: α = 0.4, β = 0.985, γ = 1.008, εhw = 0.45,
φ = 1.9, σ = 2, χ = 0.99 and ρz = 0.68.
The model matches the moments well, but cannot perfectly match the large values of both
σ(C)/σ(Y ) and σ(I)/σ(Y ) at the same time. This tradeoff can be understood by thinking
about the role played by the capital adjustment cost: if we want to increase consumption
volatility we need the collateral value of capital to be more procyclical and this can be
attained more easily with larger spikes in the price of capital; this last result arises from a
larger capital adjustment cost (higher φ) which however tends to reduce investment volatility
by penalizing spikes in investment.
Indeed, if we were to exactly match the relative standard deviation of consumption by
allowing φ to vary from the baseline calibration, we would need φ = 2.4 instead of 1.9. This
result supports our intuition on the role played by the capital adjustment cost.
3.3. Impulse Responses and Model’s Implications
The impulse responses to a 1% increase in TFP under the baseline calibration,8 which
involves the highest possible loan to value ratio (χ = 0.99), are shown in Figure 3.1 with
the solid blue lines. Additionally, the dashed green lines depict the responses to the same
8We set ρ = 0.95 in order to deliver a cleaner visualization of the dynamics.
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shock when the model is calibrated with a lower ability to borrow, χ = 0.7, while keeping
the other parameters unchanged.
Notice that every series but consumption and net debt behave in very similar ways. As a
result, the two calibrations imply a very similar collateral appreciation after a positive TFP
shock. However, the high χ economy is able to increase borrowing by more and therefore
displays a greater jump in consumption relative to the economy with a lower loan-to-value
ratio (lower χ).
This result provides the intuition for the positive relationship between ability to borrow
and relative consumption volatility that we show in Figure 3.2.
Another interesting implication has to do with the relationship between the persistence
of the TFP process and the relative consumption volatility. Figure 3.3 shows how this
relationship is not monotonic: on the one side, a very transitory process gives households
little incentives for an investment boom after a one time increase in TFP; the moderate
increase in investment translates into a small collateral appreciation and thus a small jump
in consumption. At the other extreme, when TFP is close to a unit root, households still
have little incentives to generate an investment boom as they can spread investment over
time and still take advantage of higher TFP while not having to incur large adjustment
costs; it is only at an intermediate level of persistence that households have the greatest
incentive to produce an investment boom since they know that soon enough TFP will revert
to trend. In this intermediate situation collateral is very procyclical which translates into
high relative consumption volatility.
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Figures 3.2 and 3.3 are obtained by changing the parameter values of χ and ρ respec-
tively, away from the baseline calibration and simulating the relative standard deviation of
consumption to output.
3.4. Empirical Methodology and Data
3.4.1. Empirical Methodology
In order to assess the causal effect of financial development on consumption volatility relative
to output we have to consider issues of reverse causality by which countries with very volatile
consumption paths may decide to change financial or business regulation in order to stabilize
the economy. Our identification strategy relies on an instrumental variable approach: we
use the country’s legal origin as an instrument for the country specific index of financial
development or lending regulation. We argue that the country’s legal origin is exogenous
to consumption volatility while it affects relative consumption volatility only indirectly by
shaping the specific financial and lending regulation of the country. Each Table displays
tests for the correlation of the excluded instruments with the error term (Hansen J-test of
overidentifying restrictions) and for the power of our instruments (under-identification test
and Kleibergen-Paap F test of the excluded instruments in the first stage regressions).
La Porta et al. (1999) show cross-country evidence that a country’s legal origin is a key
determinant in shaping property rights, business regulation and development of both equity
and bond markets. French civil law countries are characterized by weaker investor protection
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and less developed capital markets compared to common law countries. Previously, Levine,
Loayza and Beck (2000) and Levine (2002) have used the legal origin of a country as an
instrument for the country’s financial development in order to study the causal effect of
finance on growth in a cross section of countries.
Consider the following equations describing this two-way interaction between country i’s
relative consumption volatility, relstdi, and lending regulation, REGi:
relstdi =α1 + βREGi + i
REGi =α2 + γrelstdi + δLEGORi + ui
where the coefficient of interest is β and the second equation illustrates the endogeneity
of regulation: it can be affected by both the legal system, LEGORi, and consumption
volatility. By manipulating the above equation we can express relstdi and REGi as a
function of the two disturbance terms i and ui and the legal origin index LEGORi:
relstdi =
1
1− γβ (α1 + βα2) +
1
1− γβ i +
β
1− γβui +
γβ
1− γβLEGORi
REGi =
1
1− γβ (γα1 + α2) +
γ
1− γβ i +
1
1− γβui +
δ
1− γβLEGORi
where we assume that E(iui) = 0, E(LEGORii) = 0, E(LEGORiui) = 0 and
E(relstdiui) = 0.
We are interested in comparing the coefficients of the OLS regression with that of the IV
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regression, whose probability limits are
plim βˆOLS =
Cov(REG, relstd)
V ar(REG)
plim βˆIV =
Cov(LEGOR, relstd)
Cov(LEGOR,REG)
which, after some algebra, yield
plim βˆOLS =β +
γ(1− βγ)σ2
V ar(REG)
plim βˆIV =β
where V ar(REG) = γ2σ2 +σ
2
u + δ
2V ar(LEGOR). For stability βγ < 1, so that the sign of
the bias will depend on whether countries with unexpectedly high consumption volatility
tend to improve (γ > 0) or worsen (γ < 0) lending regulation. In the former scenario, the
OLS coefficient would overestimate the true effect while in the latter it would underesti-
mate it. After each IV regression, we test for the correlation of excluded instruments with
the error term (Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions), and we assess the power of
our instruments (under-identification test and Kleibergen-Paap F Statistic of the excluded
instruments in the first stage regressions).
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3.4.2. Data
Annual data from 1960 to 2012 on real consumption and real GDP are obtained from
the World Bank database.9 Since we are interested in analyzing the volatility of cyclical
components, we filter these time series with the HP filter. Ravn and Uhlig (2001) proved
that the filter parameter for annual data is 6.25 given a value of 1600 for quarterly data.
We drop from the sample countries that do not have at least 18 consecutive observation for
either consumption or output. We choose this cutoff value as it appears to be a natural
threshold in the data. Results are robust if we only consider countries with at least 30
consecutive observations.
The dependent variable is the relative standard deviation of consumption to output, relstd.
It is obtained by filtering the log of both series, computing their standard deviations and
finally taking the ratio of the two. In this paper, for the sake of computing the relative
standard deviation of consumption to output, we start our sample in 1990. We do so because
prior to 1990 most of the countries in our sample were not financially liberalized; both de
jure and de facto dates in which countries lift capital controls are available in Ranciere,
Tornell and Westermann (2006). As the main results in our model come from movements
in the current account, it is crucial to focus on times in which countries were allowing for
9Consumption includes the market value of all goods and services, including durable products (such as cars,
washing machines, and home computers), purchased by households. It excludes purchases of dwellings but
includes imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings. It also includes payments and fees to governments
to obtain permits and licenses. Here, household consumption expenditure includes the expenditures of
nonprofit institutions serving households, even when reported separately by the country. Investment
is gross fixed capital formation which includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on),
plant, machinery, equipment purchases and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including
schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings.
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financial claims to move in and out of the borders.
We then merge this dataset with financial development indicators and data on the legal
origin of each country. The former are obtained from the World Bank Database, while the
latter come from La Porta et al. (1999). The final sample contains 130 countries. They are
evenly split among low, low-middle, middle and high income countries, as defined by the
World Bank.
Next, we describe the financial development indicators in use: Business Regulation, Investor
Protection, Credit Information, Capitalization and Bank Credit. The first index is taken
from La Porta et al. (1999) while the others are taken from the World Bank Database, whose
definitions we closely follow.10 The business regulation index is dated 1997, Capitalization
and Bank Credit are time averages over the period 1960-2011 whereas the other regulatory
indices, namely Investor Protection and Credit Information, are available starting in 2004
on a yearly basis and they very rarely change over time.
In the regressions, each of the financial development indices is normalized by its standard
deviation to simplify the interpretation of the results.
Business Regulation. This is a rating of regulation policies related to opening and
keeping open a business. The index ranges from 1 to 5, with higher numbers indicating
that ”regulations are straight-forward and applied uniformly to all businesses and that
regulations are less of a burden to businesses”.
10http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/methodology-note
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Strength of Investor Protection. This index is the average of the Extent of Disclosure
index, the Extent of Director Liability Index and the Ease of Shareholder Suit Index: the
Extent of Disclosure index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating greater disclo-
sure regarding conflicts of interest among controlling shareholders; the Extent of Director
Liability Index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater liability of direc-
tors and members of the supervisory board of a company; finally, the Shareholders Suits
Index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater powers of shareholders to
challenge transactions undertaken by the company managers.
Credit Information. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the
availability of more credit information, from either a public credit registry or a private
credit bureau, to facilitate lending decisions. Whether public or private, a credit registry is
defined as a database that collects information on the creditworthiness of borrowers, both
individuals and firms.
Capitalization. This variable represents the market value of domestic companies listed
on the own country’s stock exchanges as a percentage of GDP.
Bank Credit. This variable equals the domestic credit provided by the banking sector
as a percentage of GDP.
The first three indices, namely Business Regulation, Strength of Investor Protection and
Credit Information, are chosen because they capture the nature of the limited enforcement
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friction behind the credit constraint we use: standard models of credit allocation under lim-
ited enforcement11 hinge on the fact that a better regulatory system that defends creditors’
rights and limits expropriation threats enables creditors to obtain larger loans for a given
value of the collateral they post; in other words, a regulatory environment that protects
creditors’ rights should give rise to a greater loan-to-value ratio.
On the other hand, the last two indices, namely Capitalization and Bank Credit, are chosen
because they are the most commonly used indices of financial development in the finance
and growth literature.12
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for some key variables we use; note that the regula-
tory variables shown here are not yet normalized by their respective standard deviations.
Importantly, we classify countries as Emerging if they belong to the bottom 75% of the
pre-1990 income distribution. Since we want to classify countries according to the distribu-
tion of a predetermined variable, the initial output distribution considers the average from
1960 to 1990 of the trend component of the log of real GDP. Countries are then classified
as Developed if they fall in the top 25% of the initial output distribution.
A crucial assumption of the model is that agents in the economy have always the desire
to borrow, both in steady state and along the transition path. Therefore, we need to check
whether this assumption has some bearing in the data. We do so by showing some summary
statistics taken from the dataset compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). It appears
that all the non-OECD countries but oil exporting ones and few asian countries, namely
11See Tirole (2010).
12See Levine (2002).
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China, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, are on average net borrowers, which is in line
with our assumption. Table 3.3 shows the relative standard deviation of consumption to
output and the time average of net foreign assets over GDP for Emerging and Developed
countries.
3.5. Results
In each regression, the respective financial or regulatory index is instrumented for by the
set of dummies indicating the country’ s legal origin. Additionally, we control for the initial
level of GDP;13 this choice is motivated by two reasons: first, richer countries can afford to
implement larger stabilizing programs that reduce consumption volatility; second, once a
country is rich enough, households may decide to accumulate buffer-stock savings in order
to partially insulate consumption streams from exogenous disturbances.
Table 3.4 shows the causal effects of different indices of financial development on relative
consumption volatility when coefficients are not allowed to vary depending on whether
a country is Emerging or Developed. The regressions point to the fact that facilitating
borrowing and lending causes the standard deviation of consumption relative to output
to increase. The channel identified by the theoretical model suggests that better lending
regulation allows agents to borrow more after a positive TFP shock, thus generating greater
consumption volatility.
For the case of Investor Protection, a one standard deviation increase in this index generates
13More precisely, the time average of the trend component of log real GDP per capita from 1960 to 1990.
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on average an increase in the standard deviation of consumption relative to output by 69
percentage points. Notice however that the Kleibergen-Paap F Statistic points to a weak
instruments problem; next, we show that this problem can be overcome by allowing for the
effect of financial development on consumption volatility to depend on whether the country
is Emerging or Developed.14
Table 3.5 below shows the heterogeneous impact of lending regulation and financial de-
velopment on relative consumption volatility depending on whether a country is Emerging
or Developed: the detrimental effect of better lending regulation on relative consumption
volatility applies only to emerging countries, not to developed ones. For emerging markets,
the only coefficient that is not negative and significant is that of Bank Credit, suggesting
that the role of banks in lending to households and businesses is not destabilizing, while
funding channeled through the capital market is. Regarding developed countries, most of
the financial development indicators do not significantly affect the relative consumption
volatility, and better credit information and a more developed banking system tend to sta-
bilize fluctuations of consumption relative to output.15
These finding are in line with the assumptions behind our model: the ability to borrow am-
plifies consumption fluctuation only to the extent that financial markets are not complete,
the representative household is borrowing constrained and the country is a net borrower in
steady state. These assumptions are more relevant for emerging economies than for devel-
14Tables 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 show the first stage regressions.
15The reliability of the regressions for developed countries is however undermined by weak instruments
problems.
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oped ones and our findings support this perspective.
Moreover, notice that the regressions for emerging markets that use Capitalization and
Credit Information successfully pass all the diagnostic tests, while the other three regres-
sions suffer from weak instruments.16
Next, Table 3.6 shows that the previous results are robust to the inclusion of a larger set of
controls that affect both consumption and output volatility. Here we mainly follow Kose,
Prasad and Terrones (2007) in the choice of additional controls: government expenditure
over GDP aims at capturing the potential reduction in consumption volatility due to the
implementation of stabilization programs; volatility in terms of trade and net exports over
GDP can affect both consumption and output volatility by altering the international com-
petitiveness of the country. All the controls are computed on the pre-1990 period in order
to avoid as much as possible the inclusion of additional simultaneity bias.17
In emerging economies, stock market capitalization and credit information are still the only
two variables that significantly increase relative consumption volatility and that success-
fully pass the diagnostic tests. Notice also that adding further controls reinforces the main
results: the coefficients of interest are indeed larger in Table 3.6 than in Table 3.5.
Finally, Table 3.7 provides some evidence on the direction of the OLS bias. By compar-
ing the IV and OLS coefficients we notice that OLS largely underestimates the effect of
financial development on the dependent variable when we use Investor Protection, Business
16Following Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) we consider a value of the Kleibergen-Paap F Statistic below 10
as suggestive of weak instruments.
17Variables are obtained from the World Bank Database.
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Regulation and Capitalization whereas it slightly overestimates the effects of Bank Credit
and Credit Information.
3.6. Conclusion
We build a small open economy model with borrowing constrained agents in order to iden-
tify a channel through which stationary technology shocks can make consumption more
volatile than output. The main implication of the model is that a better ability to borrow
against collateral, namely a higher loan-to-value ratio, translates into greater consumption
volatility relative to output. The theory of corporate finance establishes a negative relation-
ship between the loan-to-value ratio and the borrower’s ability to extract private benefits
from running a project. We thus proxy the LTV ratio with indices pertaining to the qual-
ity of lending regulation. Then, we perform an empirical analysis to check whether the
model’s prediction is supported by the data. In order to avoid issues of reverse causality,
we instrument each index of regulatory standards or financial development by the country’s
legal origin. We find that improvements in lending regulation and deeper domestic capital
markets lead to an increase in the relative volatility of consumption to output; moreover,
this effect is only present in low and middle income economies. Financial globalization and
financial development are often believed to benefit emerging economies in particular; while
it is well documented that financial development has positive effects on output growth,
its impact on volatility has received less attention in the literature. To this regard, our
findings suggest that deeper capital markets and more lending friendly regulation do not
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improve consumption risk sharing in emerging markets; instead they increase the ratio of
consumption volatility to output volatility, in accordance with the prediction of our model.
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Table 3.1.: Empirical Moments and Simulated Moments for Emerging Economies
Empirical Moments Empirical Moments Simulated Moments
(AG) (our sample)
σ(C)/σ(Y ) 1.45 1.49 1.33
σ(I)/σ(Y ) 3.91 4.2 3.13
σ(NX/Y ) 3.22 3.46 4.02
ρ(C, Y ) 0.72 0.56 0.65
ρ(I, Y ) 0.77 0.49 0.63
ρ(NX/Y, Y ) -0.51 -0.1 -0.74
Table 3.2.: Summary Statistics by Income Level
Full Sample Emerging Developed
Variable Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Relative St.Dev. of Consumption 1.38 0.72 1.49 0.78 0.98 0.29
Business Regulation 2.85 0.86 2.62 0.81 3.63 0.63
Investors Protection 4.92 1.60 4.61 1.41 6.03 1.79
Credit Information 2.60 2.15 2.22 2.02 4.00 2.05
Capitalization 42.62 46.32 31.59 34.81 81.64 60.00
Bank Credit 46.89 35.33 38.41 26.16 93.85 42.54
log(Initial GDP) 7.52 1.48 6.87 1.07 9.51 0.35
N 130 102 28
Figure 3.2.: LTV ratio and σ(C)/σ(Y ) Figure 3.3.: TFP persistence and σ(C)/σ(Y )
Table 3.3.: Summary Statistics by Income Level
Emerging Developed
Variable Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Relative St.Dev. of Consumption 1.49 0.78 0.98 0.29
Average NFA/GDP -0.44 0.52 0.19 1.07
N 102 28
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Table 3.4.: The Effect of Regulation on Consumption Volatility
All Countries
relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd
Investor Protection 0.689∗∗
(0.307)
Business Regulation 0.690∗∗
(0.304)
Capitalization 0.769∗∗
(0.307)
Bank Credit -0.338∗∗
(0.166)
Credit Info -0.305
(0.253)
Initial GDP -0.393∗∗∗ -0.563∗∗∗ -0.497∗∗∗ -0.054 -0.107
(0.092) (0.137) (0.146) (0.092) (0.117)
N 115 109 86 115 115
p-val of Hansen 0.292 0.347 0.826 0.032 0.017
p-val of Underid 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.282 0.046
K-P F stat 4.152 5.121 4.079 2.159 7.534
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.5.: The Heterogeneous Effect of Regulation on Consumption Volatility
Emerging Developed
relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd
Investor Protection 1.206∗∗ 0.369
(0.486) (0.296)
Business Regulation 1.667∗ 0.052
(0.999) (0.177)
Bank Credit 8.113 -0.343∗
(13.98) (0.190)
Capitalization 0.628∗∗∗ 0.106
(0.238) (0.118)
Credit Info 0.398∗∗ -0.879∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.273)
Initial GDP -0.540∗∗∗ -1.119∗ -2.400 -0.305∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.219 -0.548∗∗∗ -0.067 -0.636∗∗∗ 0.241
(0.184) (0.572) (3.821) (0.160) (0.120) (0.474) (0.194) (0.352) (0.214) (0.308)
N 100 93 100 71 100 28 27 28 26 28
p-val Hansen 0.176 0.892 0.990 0.157 0.143 0.364 0.0879 0.441 0.114 0.683
p-val Underid 0.065 0.143 0.961 0.004 0.032 0.101 0.021 0.123 0.179 0.274
K-P F stat 2.819 1.818 0.094 34.08 20.02 2.865 4.127 3.542 1.719 6.673
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6.: The Heterogeneous Effect of Regulation on Consumption Volatility - Robustness
Emerging Developed
relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd
Investor Protection 0.278 0.155∗∗
(0.347) (0.074)
Business Regulation -0.037 -0.032
(0.654) (0.207)
Bank Credit 0.280 -0.347
(0.500) (0.974)
Capitalization 0.731∗∗ 0.0780
(0.335) (0.147)
Credit Info 0.878∗∗ 0.417
(0.419) (0.458)
Initial GDP -0.091 -0.066 -0.124 -0.143 -0.525∗ -0.393∗ -0.535∗∗∗ -0.333 -0.448 -0.467
(0.103) (0.310) (0.154) (0.127) (0.317) (0.219) (0.195) (0.394) (0.274) (0.456)
G/Y -0.026 -0.031 -0.035 -0.066 0.018 -0.041∗∗ -0.007 -0.026 -0.011 -0.023
(0.025) (0.038) (0.033) (0.047) (0.042) (0.019) (0.031) (0.049) (0.020) (0.019)
σ(G/Y) 0.145∗∗∗ 0.118 0.133∗∗ 0.441∗∗ 0.082 0.093 -0.029 -0.116 0.058 0.108
(0.055) (0.076) (0.054) (0.189) (0.065) (0.107) (0.103) (0.556) (0.097) (0.129)
σ(TOT) -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
σ(NX/Y) 0.247∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.290∗ 0.265∗∗ 0.313∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.196 0.318∗∗∗ 0.470
(0.125) (0.087) (0.150) (0.127) (0.154) (0.111) (0.094) (0.212) (0.111) (0.330)
N 68 65 68 45 68 23 23 23 23 23
p-val of Hansen 0.580 0.870 0.555 0.396 0.960 0.148 0.056 0.525 0.082 0.141
p-val of Underid 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.002
K-P F stat 220.9 162.3 54.13 13.46 39.46 70.91 18.19 68.70 13.68 100.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
G/Y stands for government expenditure over GDP, TOT stands for terms of trade, NX/Y stands for net export over GDP;
σ(X) indicates the standard deviation of variable X.
Table 3.7.: The Effect of Regulation on Consumption Volatility - All Countries
IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS
relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd relstd
Investor Protection 0.689∗∗ -0.0689
(0.307) (0.0860)
Business Regulation 0.690∗∗ -0.0725
(0.304) (0.110)
Capitalization 0.769∗∗ -0.0145
(0.307) (0.0504)
Bank Credit -0.338∗∗ -0.297∗∗
(0.166) (0.119)
Credit Info -0.305 -0.246∗∗
(0.253) (0.101)
Initial GDP -0.393∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.563∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.497∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.0546 -0.0749 -0.107 -0.126∗
(0.0922) (0.0672) (0.137) (0.0712) (0.146) (0.0735) (0.0917) (0.0852) (0.117) (0.0725)
N 115 115 109 109 86 86 115 115 115 115
p-val of Hansen 0.292 0.347 0.826 0.032 0.017
p-val of Underid 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.282 0.046
K-P F stat 4.152 5.121 4.079 2.159 7.534
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.8.: First Stage Regressions - All Countries
Investor Business Stock Market Bank Credit
Protection Regulation Capitalization Credit Information
Initial GDP 0.292∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
(0.0634) (0.0490) (0.0918) (0.0645) (0.0649)
United Kingdom 0.817∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗ 0.421 -0.166
(0.360) (0.295) (0.427) (0.302) (0.267)
France -0.0558 0.478∗ 0.0253 0.293 0.125
(0.315) (0.279) (0.291) (0.246) (0.232)
Soviet Union -0.0188 0.163 -0.0798 0.494∗ -0.364
(0.364) (0.326) (0.335) (0.285) (0.276)
Germany -0.251 0.312 1.566∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗
(0.481) (0.543) (0.624) (0.160)
Scandinavia -0.145
(0.322)
N 115 109 86 115 115
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.9.: First Stage Regressions - Emerging Markets
Investor Business Stock Market Bank Credit
Protection Regulation Capitalization Credit Information
Initial GDP 0.349∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
(0.0945) (0.0759) (0.107) (0.0671) (0.0813)
United Kingdom 0.474 0.0684 -0.943∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.224) (0.242)
France -0.188 -0.177 -0.819∗∗∗ -0.0100 -0.656∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.176) (0.296) (0.140) (0.183)
Soviet Union -0.138 -0.515∗∗ -1.143∗∗∗ -0.0384 -1.243∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.243) (0.314) (0.117) (0.167)
Germany -0.465∗∗ -0.475
(0.199) (0.341)
Scandinavia
N 100 93 71 100 100
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.10.: First Stage Regressions - Developed Countries
Investor Business Stock Market Bank Credit
Protection Regulation Capitalization Credit Information
Initial GDP -0.0158 0.169 1.118∗ -0.194 -0.246
(0.631) (0.290) (0.548) (0.700) (0.641)
United Kingdom 1.331∗ 1.101∗∗∗ 1.231∗∗ -1.694 -1.229∗∗
(0.709) (0.346) (0.566) (1.013) (0.551)
France -0.0177 0.326 0.561 -1.374 -1.017∗
(0.644) (0.349) (0.473) (0.901) (0.562)
Soviet Union
Germany 0.0281 0.107
(0.370) (0.732)
Scandinavia 0.371 -1.985∗∗ -0.763∗∗∗
(0.567) (0.777) (0.178)
N 28 27 26 28 28
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 3.1.: Impulse responses to a 1% increase in TFP.
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A.1. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The proof simply follows from inspecting the system of equations
1.9: dP (def)dβ > 0 if and only if ξ < ψ +
2
γ (α+ β)(α+ β + γ)
∂ψ
∂β ≡ ξβ, and dP (def)dα > 0 if and
only if ξ < ψ + 2γ (α+ β)(α+ β + γ)
∂ψ
∂α ≡ ξα. 
Proof of Proposition 2 From the first equation in 1.9, dP (def)dξ < 0 follows from the fact
that φ1 ∈ (0, 1√2pi ]. Next, we prove the second derivative result for the case of the precision
of private signals; the proof is similar for the case of the precision of public signals. From
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the first equation in 1.11, the second derivative is negative if and only if
(ψ − ξ)2 + 2
γ
(α+ β)(α+ β + γ)
∂ψ
∂β
(ψ − ξ)− 1
η2
< 0 (A.1)
which is a convex parabola in (ψ−ξ) with critical point (ψ−ξ)∗ = − 1γ (α+β)(α+β+γ)∂ψ∂β .
The quadratic equation obtained by replacing the inequality in A.1 with an equality has
two solutions,
x1 = (ψ − ξ)∗ −
√
∆β and x2 = (ψ − ξ)∗ +
√
∆β (A.2)
where
∆β ≡ [(ψ − ξ)∗]2 + 1
η2
(A.3)
and A.1 is satisfied for (ψ − ξ) ∈ (x1, x2) or ξ ∈ (ξLβ, ξHβ), where
ξLβ ≡ ψ − (ψ − ξ)∗ −
√
∆β
and
ξHβ ≡ ψ − (ψ − ξ)∗ +
√
∆β
(A.4)
Repeating the same logic for d
2P (def)
dξdα we get
ξLα ≡ ψ + 1γ (α+ β)(α+ β + γ)∂ψ∂α −
√
∆α
and
ξHα ≡ ψ + 1γ (α+ β)(α+ β + γ)∂ψ∂α +
√
∆α
(A.5)
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where
∆α ≡
[
1
γ
(α+ β)(α+ β + γ)
∂ψ
∂α
]2
+
1
η2
(A.6)

Proof of Proposition 3 The first result follows from the last equation in 1.9, recalling
that that the sufficient condition for uniqueness, i.e. α√
β
<
√
2pi
z , implies that 1− zφ2 α√β ≥
1− z 1√
2pi
α√
β
> 0 and that ψ ∈ [0, z]. The last statement follows from equation 1.6; indeed,
as y → −∞ we get that ψ → 0 and when y → +∞ we get that ψ → z. Regarding the
second result, by looking at the last equation in 1.11 we see that the sign of the second
derivative is the same as the sign of (ψ − ξ)ψ. As ψ > 0, we conclude that d2P (def)dξdz < 0 if
and only if ξ > ψ.

A.2. Bayesian Learning and Forecast Errors
Here we show that under Bayesian Learning, current expectations are affected by past fore-
cast errors; this, together with the assumption that exclusion restriction holds, establishes
the validity of past forecast errors as instruments for current forecasts. We closely follow
Bullard and Suda (2008). Suppose that the true fundamental, θ, follows an AR(1) process:
θt = a+ bθt−1 + ut (A.7)
130
A. The Role of Dispersed Information in Pricing Default: Evidence from the Great Recession
where a and b are unknown parameters, and ut ∼ N(0, ν2). A Bayesian Learner has priors
on the parameters of equation A.7: φ′0 = (a0 b0) ∼ N(µ0,Ω0). In her mind, the conditional
distribution of θt given all the information known in the period before is
θt | Θt−1, φt−1 ∼ N(at−1 + bt−1θt−1, ν2), where Θt is the history of θs up to period t.
By Bayes’ rule, f(φ | Θt) ∝ f(Θt | φ)f(φ) ∝ f(θt | φ,Θt−1)f(θt−1 | φ,Θt−2) . . . f(θ1 |
φ)f(φ).
Define zt = (1 θt−1)′ and Zt being the history of zs up to period t. Then, f(φ | Θt) =
N(µt,Ωt), where µt = Ωt
(
Ω−10 φ0 + ν
−2(Z ′tΘt)
)
and Ωt =
(
Ω−10 + ν
−2(Z ′tZt)
)−1.
In recursive form, Ω−1t = Ω
−1
t−1 + ν
−2ztz′t and µt = µt−1 + Ωtν−2zt(θt − z′tµt−1).
Finally, Etθt+1 = z′t+1µt = z′t+1µt−1 + z′t+1Ωtν−2zt(θt − z′tµt−1), where θt − z′tµt−1 is last
period’s forecast error. We can also write it as a weighted sum of all the past forecast errors:
Etθt+1 = z′t+1
∞∑
j=0
Ωt−jν−2zt−j(θt−j − z′t−jµt−j−1) (A.8)
Therefore, today’s forecast Etθt+1 is a weighted sum of past forecast errors. We would
obtain essentially the same expression for the case of Recursive Learning1.
Finally, we take a linear approximation of equation A.8 around the unbiased stochastic
1See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a reference.
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steady state2 to obtain
dEtθt+1 ≈
∞∑
j=0
c¯−jdfet−j +
∞∑
j=0
dct−j f¯ e (A.9)
where fet−j ≡ (θt−j − z′t−jµt−j−1), ct−j ≡ z′t+1Ωt−jν−2zt−j and the upper bar denotes a
variable at the non-stochastic steady state. Since on average forecast errors are zero, i.e.
f¯ e = 0, equation A.9 simplifies to
dEtθt+1 ≈
∞∑
j=0
c¯−jdfet−j (A.10)
which is linear in the forecast errors. ’
A.2.1. Unknown Variance of the Error Term
In what follows we show that, when the variance of the error term is also unknown, the
expected variance can be written recursively; this means that past expectations over the
variance are correlated with current expectations. Once we assume that past expectations of
the error term variance do not directly affect CDS spreads, we have that the previous period
expectation of the error term variance is a valid instrument for its current expectation.
Going back to the previous setup, instead of assuming that ut ∼ N(0, ν2), where ν is
known, we now suppose that the prior of ν−2 follows a Gamma distribution, ν−2 ∼ Γ(N, τ);
2By unbiased we mean that forecast errors are on average zero and the notion of a stochastic steady state
is required for the sequence of variance-covariance matrices {Ωt−j} not to be degenerate at the steady
state, which would have been the case at a non-stochastic steady state.
132
A. The Role of Dispersed Information in Pricing Default: Evidence from the Great Recession
according to the priors, the expected value and the variance of ν−2 are N and 2N/τ2
respectively.
Proposition 12.3 at page 356 in Hamilton (1994) provides two useful results: first, the
bayesian estimate of the coefficient vector is identical to the estimate obtained for the case
of known variance of the error term; second, the time t expected variance of the error term
is
E(ν2 | Zt) = τ∗t /N∗t
where
N∗t = N + t
τ∗t = τ + U ′tUt + (βt − µ0)′Ω−10 (Z ′tZt + Ω−10 )−1Z ′tZt(βt − µ0)
(A.11)
for Ut = [u1, u2, ..., ut]′ and βt = (Z ′tZt)−1Ztθt, the OLS estimator of the AR(1) coefficients
a and b.
Following Hamilton (1994) at page 357, if we further assume diffuse prior information
which is represented by N = τ = 0 and Ω0 = 0, we obtain that the expected variance of
the error term can be written recursively in an additive fashion:
E(ν2 | Zt) = 1tU ′tUt = 1t
∑t
i=1 u
2
i
= t−1t E(ν
2 | Zt−1) + 1tu2t
(A.12)
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A.3. On the Identification of α and β
In this subsection we explicitly index each variable by time (t) and bank’s identity (i). For
instance, δit refers to the dispersion of beliefs regarding bank i at time t. We have previously
shown in equation 1.8 that δ2it =
βit
(αit+βit)2
. One could think that by exploiting some other
source of variation we would be able to obtain another equation that relates an observable
to both αit and βit; if that was the case we would have two equations in two unknowns,
potentially backing out both variables of interest, αit and βit. We are going to show that
in order to do so we have to impose restrictions that we believe to be too restrictive.3 The
other source of variation we could exploit is the variance of forecast errors. Consistently
with the model previously presented, we think that the performance of the bank is the sum
of a predictable component, θit, and an unpredictable component, τit. For simplicity, we
define rit ≡ θit + τit to be such a variable. Then, the model suggests that the mean (or
median) forecast error is feit ≡ rit − ξit = τit + αit(θit−yit)αit+βit . Under the same assumptions
about τ presented in the model, the variance of forecast errors is V (feit) = 1γit +
αit
(αit+βit)2
.
There are two reasons for not being able to obtain the two variables of interest: first, a
third term appears, γit, which is not observable; secondly, even if we were to set γit = ∞,
we would still be unable to compute V (feit). Indeed, we only observe one forecast error
for each bank at each point in time. In order to circumvent this problem we would have
to impose some restrictions, such as assuming that V (feit) is the same across banks within
each period or that it is constant across time within each bank. We believe that any of
3We thank Nikola Tarashev for helpful suggestions.
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those assumptions is too restrictive. On the other hand, we prefer to assume that β > α
so that (as previously shown) both of them have the same impact on dispersion of beliefs,
which we observe.
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B.1. Steady State
The steady state is characterized by the following system of equations:
q = 1
b =
χk
1 + r
y = hαk1−α
i
k
= γ + δ − 1
µ
λ
=
γ
1 + r
− β˜
λ = (c−Ψhν)−σ
h =
( α
νΨ
k1−α
) 1
ν−α
c = y − k
(
χ(1 + r − γ)
1 + r
+ (γ + δ − 1)
)
k =
(
γ − β˜(1− δ)− χ(γ/(1 + r)− β˜)
β˜(1− α)
(νΨ
α
) α
ν−α
) ν−α
ν(1−α)
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B.2. Log Linear Approximation
Output:
yˆt = zˆt + αhˆt + (1− α)kˆt (B.1)
Labor Demand:
wˆt = yˆt − hˆt (B.2)
Labor Supply:
hˆt = εhwwˆt (B.3)
where εhw = 1ν−1 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Marginal Utility of Consumption:
λˆt = −σ
(
θ1cˆt + ν(1− θ1)hˆt
)
(B.4)
where θ1 ≡ cc−Ψhν .
Law of Motion of Capital:
iˆt =
1
γ + δ − 1(γkˆt+1 − (1− δ)kˆt) (B.5)
Price of Capital:
qˆt =
φ
γ2
(γ + δ − 1)(ˆit − kˆt) (B.6)
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Capital Euler Equation:
γ
(
1− χ
1 + r
)
λˆt + γqˆt =
[
γ − χ
(
β˜ +
µ
λ
)]
Etλˆt+1 +
[
χ
µ
λ
+ β˜(1− δ)
]
Etqˆt+1+
+
[
β˜(1− α)y
k
]
Etdˆt+1 + β˜φ
(
γ + δ − 1
γ
)2
Et(ˆit+1 − kˆt+1)
Capital Demand:
dˆt = yˆt − kˆt (B.7)
Bond Euler Equation:
µ
λ
µˆt =
γ
1 + r
λˆt − β˜(1 + r)Etλˆt+1 (B.8)
Credit Constraint:
bˆt+1 = kˆt+1 +
1
k
Etqˆt+1 (B.9)
Budget Constraint:
yˆt = sccˆt + sb
(
(1 + r)bˆt − γbˆt+1
)
+ siiˆt (B.10)
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